

Aggregate-Demand Amplification of Supply Disruptions: The Entry-Exit Multiplier^I

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Abstract

Due to its impact on nominal firm profits, price rigidity amplifies the response of entry and exit to adverse supply shocks, such as COVID-19. This “entry-exit multiplier” triggers substantial magnification of the welfare losses due to negative supply shocks—especially when wages are also rigid. This is in stark contrast to the benchmark New Keynesian model (NK), which predicts a *positive* output gap in response to that same shock under the same monetary policy. Endogenous entry-exit thus radically changes the consequences of nominal rigidities. In addition to the aggregate-demand amplification of supply disruptions, our model also reconciles the response of hours worked across the NK and RBC models. And unlike the standard NK model, our model can also be used to evaluate how monetary expansions can alleviate or even eliminate the *negative* output gap induced by supply disruptions.

JEL Codes: E3, E4, E5, E6

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1 Introduction

When and how do nominal rigidities *amplify* supply disruptions? That is, when do negative supply shocks generate an aggregate-demand recession, understood as a greater fall in the level of output and income relative to the benchmark case without nominal rigidities? We show that this is an inherent feature of a business cycle model with *endogenous entry-exit and product variety*—whereas the standard “New Keynesian” model with no entry (hereafter NK) predicts a *positive* output gap in response to a negative productivity shock. The endogenous responses of entry-exit associated with those nominal rigidities thus plays a key role in delivering this important business cycle comovement and in shaping the design of monetary policy in response to it. The key intuition is that nominal rigidities also *distort the extensive margin*. We start with the simplest pared-down model in order highlight how each channel operates. We then build up layers leading to our full model in order to quantitatively assess the importance of our amplification channel and additionally incorporate an analysis of monetary policy.

The economic recession following the recent COVID-19 crisis is a recent example highlighting the importance of the extensive margin, given the associated very sharp responses in business entry and exit. The increase in exit exhibited during that time reached hitherto unseen magnitudes: in the spring of 2020, one third of small businesses closed down and many of the consumer or intermediate input varieties customarily consumed by households and firms have simply become unavailable.¹ At the same time, a deep recession developed, with most macroeconomists agreeing that this reflected a fall of output below potential, i.e. a negative “output gap”. The negative supply impulse that we consider as a metaphor for the COVID-19 crisis is a classic negative productivity shock: a downward shift in the production function associated with severe restrictions on the availability of inputs.

We first show that the response of entry-exit to such supply shocks is amplified in a model with sticky prices, when firms cannot optimally adjust prices in response to productivity shocks:

¹Real-time data from Womply (Chetty et al, 2020) shows that 30% of U.S. small businesses closed down in the first quarter of 2020, and 7 to 10% stayed closed throughout 2020 and most of 2021. Data from Homebase, Crane et al (2021) paints a similar picture. Entry data that would parallel this for the production side is unavailable; existing real-time measures of broad “entry” such as the Census Bureau’s Business Formation Statistics discussed in Haltiwanger (2020) are unlikely to reflect “real” entry translating fully into jobs and production. That measure of new business applications also fell by 40% at the onset of the crisis, to then recover to unprecedented levels throughout Q2 and Q3; however, this was not reflected in the Q2 and Q3 entry data from the Business Employment Dynamics that came out subsequently.

a supply-side phenomenon we dub *the entry-exit multiplier*. Nominal rigidities induce changes in profits that trigger entry-exit dynamics, setting off a feedback loop to (endogenous) aggregate productivity. Consider a negative shock. Firms wish to increase their price to reflect their increased marginal cost. With sticky prices they cannot, so they are "stuck" with their suboptimal price. This induces further losses and triggers further exit, engendering an additional (endogenous) aggregate productivity decrease that amplifies the initial impulse.² The endogenous fall in aggregate productivity is driven by the inefficient equilibrium level of variety.

In our benchmark economy where output is a constant elasticity of substitution aggregate of intermediate inputs, henceforth CES, entry responds proportionately with the supply shock when prices are flexible. This is the well-known market size effect on entry with constant markups going back to Krugman (1980). When prices are sticky, however, the same supply shock leads to a more than proportionate response of entry. This is the entry-exit "multiplier" under sticky prices. While this channel is present and operates in any model with entry and nominal rigidities studying monetary policies (see i.a. Bilbiie Ghironi Melitz 2007; Bergin Corsetti 2008; Bilbiie Fujiwara Ghironi 2014; Bilbiie 2019), its consequences for aggregate demand amplification and demand-drive recessions had not been previously characterized. This is our paper's first contribution.³

We characterize the conditions under which *aggregate-demand amplification* of supply shocks (a magnified response of aggregate output under sticky prices) occurs—relative to the flexible-price benchmark. It is well-known that such a negative supply shock *cannot* drive a demand recession in a standard NK model, wherein (given a standard monetary policy rule) a temporary negative productivity shock implies an *increase* in the output gap: a smaller fall in output under sticky prices than under flexible prices.⁴ Our second contribution is thus to analyze the entry-exit multiplier's ensuing impact on aggregate demand.

We first show that in our benchmark CES economy with sticky prices, amplification of *negative*

²This mechanism captures an intuition that is more general than the inability to reset prices. It applies more generally to profitability shocks induced by nominal rigidities. Thus, this is a reduced form for frictions that impinge upon intensive-margin adjustments, with negative consequences for profitability.

³Our results generalize to models of entry with sunk costs where the number of firms acts as a state variable providing propagation and matching profits' dynamics, such as Bilbiie Ghironi, and Melitz (2007, 2012) and Gutierrez, Jones, and Philippon (2021). We nevertheless focus on the free-entry, zero-profits model of entry with a fixed per-period cost for analytical tractability (as in e.g. Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) for flexible prices and Bilbiie (2019) for sticky prices).

⁴Our analysis assumes throughout that the central bank does not act in order to completely "undo" the effect of nominal rigidity (which it can do by changing money supply or interests rates). That is, we derive the implications of supply shocks for a given, suboptimal monetary policy rule—the same suboptimal rule in both models, with and without entry. We then return to the analysis of monetary policy itself.

shocks always occurs. Indeed, we identify an asymmetry in the effects of shocks on the "output gap": negative shocks make sticky-price output over-react and positive shocks make it under-react. In this benchmark case, the responses to shocks under either sticky or flexible prices are identical to the first order, thus isolating the contribution of higher-order nonlinear terms. This effect is driven by the curvature of output in intermediate input variety. It is increasing in the elasticity of substitution between goods under sticky prices.⁵ With *no* (or *exogenous*) entry and exit—such as the standard NK model—the response of aggregate activity is proportional to the adverse supply shock when prices are flexible: if productivity falls by 1%, consumption and output fall by 1%. In this case, the response is at most proportional, and generally smaller than 1% under sticky prices. In other words, there is aggregate-demand *dampening* of supply shocks, an issue well-known in NK models.⁶

With *endogenous* entry and exit, there is amplification of the aggregate response relative to this no-entry model, even under *flexible* prices. This is due to the "increasing returns" inherent in an expanding-variety model magnifying the effect of productivity shocks, whereby entry variations act as endogenous aggregate productivity.⁷ But there is *further* amplification under sticky prices. Thus, endogenous entry-exit radically changes the consequences of sticky prices for supply disruptions: price stickiness *dampens* the aggregate response without entry, but it *amplifies* that aggregate response with entry-exit. Furthermore, the sticky-price amplification of recessions under entry-exit is an increasing function of the *size* of the exogenous disruption: the amplification works in part through higher-order, nonlinear terms due to the concavity of welfare in the number of input varieties. This is particularly relevant for large shocks like those associated with the COVID-19 crisis, where such nonlinearities are likely to be especially important.

This mechanism is highlighted most clearly in this simplest setup, yet generalizes to envi-

⁵Throughout, we focus on a nonlinear solution of the model that captures higher-order effects. The latter are especially important with large shocks like the COVID-19 crisis, which is associated with unprecedented changes in aggregate variables rendering first-order perturbation methods insufficient and potentially misleading.

⁶The response on output with sticky prices itself can be positive (if prices are not entirely fixed, etc.) – but the key point is that, for plausible monetary policy rules, it is always less than one. That is, the output gap (the key summary statistic) is positive in response to negative supply shocks (the response under sticky is smaller than under flexible prices).

⁷This amplification is studied in detail i.a. in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012) in a model with sunk-cost dynamic entry, and earlier in Devereux, Head and Lapham (1996) and Chatterjee and Cooper (1993) in a "static entry" model. It is also related to the welfare gain of trade and market size in the "new trade theory" with monopolistic competition, e.g. Melitz (2003). Gopinath and Neiman (2014) provide trade-based empirical evidence for the negative effects of adverse shocks on endogenous productivity.

ronments that are more realistic in several dimensions. In particular, we extend our analysis to the case of arbitrary utility curvature (and thus intertemporal substitution) in consumption. The requirement for the entry-exit multiplier and for aggregate-demand amplification of *aggregate* supply shocks is then that the elasticity of substitution between goods be *higher* than the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. Virtually all empirical estimates for those two elasticities satisfy this ranking.

An important additional implication of our framework for business-cycle analysis is that entry-exit brings the response of hours worked in our sticky-price model in line with the response of its flexible-price counterpart (akin to the workhorse RBC model). This resolves a long-standing issue with NK models that has been the subject of a spirited debate. In particular, while RBC models focus on—and embed at their core—procyclical hours worked, standard NK models customarily imply countercyclical hours in response to productivity shocks. Since this is driven by income effects on labor due to profit variations, the entry-exit channel endogenously eliminates those income effects and can thus generate procyclical hours just like its the flexible-price counterpart. Of course, the model can still imply arbitrary hours’ responses to TFP shocks: their sign, however, will not be governed by price stickiness but by whether the shock is transitory or persistent, by labor supply elasticity and income effect—features that seem more inherently relevant for the dynamics of hours.

While in the simplest version of our model the amplification of aggregate demand through our entry-exit multiplier occurs through the second-order effects emphasized above, it can also have a first-order impact when the equilibrium level of entry is inefficient. To highlight this, we explore deviations from CES aggregation that feature such an inefficiency, e.g. the presence of external returns to intermediate input variety. Our main takeaway is that the entry-exit multiplier then yields first-order aggregate-demand amplification when the aggregate productivity benefit of input variety is larger than the net markup (the profit incentive for entrants): supply-driven demand recessions occur when “demand” forces exceed “supply” forces for the creation and destruction of new input varieties. Entry-exit is then inefficiently low in the market equilibrium relative to the planner’s optimum. But under sticky prices the response of entry-exit is magnified through the multiplier effect that we identified. This immediately translates into first-order magnification of

the output response too.⁸

The minimal set of “necessary ingredients” for the aggregate demand amplification we identify are endogenous entry-exit and sticky good prices. Yet this simplest model has two inherent shortcomings: the quantitative relevance of this amplification channel therein is a fortiori small; and this model version is ill-suited for a realistic analysis of monetary policy. Our full model in Section 4 which features sticky wages in addition to sticky prices fully addresses both of these concerns. Wage stickiness implies first-order amplification effects—arising from the inefficiency of labor allocation to entry—such that the quantitative magnitude for the amplification channel rises by over 2 orders of magnitude. Furthermore, the counterfactual predictions regarding the entry response to monetary policy shocks disappear: by making markups less countercyclical and profits per firm procyclical, wage stickiness implies an increase in entry in response to a monetary expansion. We then show that expansionary monetary policy can be employed to mitigate—and, when optimally chosen, completely close—the negative output gap induced by supply disruptions.

It should be emphasized that it is really the interaction of these nominal rigidities with entry that gives rise to all these desirable business-cycle properties; indeed, we show—both in the quantitative version and analytically—that a model with the same rigidities but with fixed entry (the standard New Keynesian model with both rigidities) still suffers from the same well-known issues, in particular a positive output gap in response to a negative productivity shock.⁹ Therefore, we conclude that the New Keynesian framework needs to include endogenous entry-exit as well as both nominal rigidities (in prices and wages) in order to deliver *at the same time* (i) demand recessions in response to negative supply shocks, (ii) realistic dynamics following demand shocks, and (the combination of i and ii) (iii) an expansionary monetary policy as the optimal response to a negative supply shock inducing a negative output gap.

⁸Although we initially focus on the non-linear implications of our basic NK model, we also develop a loglinearized framework of a substantially more general model in terms of functional forms. We highlight the connections with the textbook treatments of the NK model such as Woodford (2003) and Galí (2008).

⁹We also show that a model with entry but sticky wages only (flexible prices) suffers from a different issue: since firms can restore profitability by resetting prices and consumers can substitute intertemporally, a negative supply shock implies a future expansion.

Related literature

A large and growing literature emphasizes the role of endogenous entry and variety with *flexible prices* for business cycles, studying macro fluctuations and normative properties i.a. Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012, 2019), Colciago and Etro (2010), Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008, Hamano and Zanetti (2017), Cacciatore and Fiori (2016), Dixon and Savagar (2020), Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2020), Michelacci, Paciello, and Pozzi (2019). A few papers have analyzed these models with nominal rigidities, focusing on monetary policy (Bilbiie Ghironi Melitz, 2007; Bergin and Corsetti, 2008; Bilbiie, Fujiwara, and Ghironi, 2014; Lewis and Poilly, 2014).¹⁰

In our model, the direction of the response of hours worked to supply shocks is invariant to price stickiness. This has significant implications for the literature studying and contrasting the empirical properties of RBC and NK models, e.g. Gali (1999), Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2008), and Alexopoulos (2011). Cantore et al (2014) focus on different mechanisms: factor-augmenting shocks and capital-labor substitutability.¹¹

The standard NK model's failure to produce demand-recessions in response to negative supply shocks is the starting point of a recent important contribution, Guerrieri et al (2020), that is complementary to ours. The authors call such occurrences "Keynesian supply shocks" and build a 2-sector model that predicts those responses to *sector-specific* exogenous-exit shocks when sectors are Edgeworth complements. Our focus is on a different, complementary channel driven by the *endogenous* entry-exit decisions in response to *aggregate* supply shocks affecting all firms and products symmetrically at the disaggregated level.¹² More recently, Auerbach, Gorodnichenko, and Murphy (2021) also emphasize exit as an amplification channel following the reduction in revenues due to restrictions on a subset of products with rigid capital operating costs. Other con-

¹⁰Earlier pioneering contributions on RBC-like models with entry include Chatterjee and Cooper (1993), Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996), Campbell (1998), and Cook (2001); Chatterjee et al (1993) and Jaimovich (2007) focused on entry and strategic complementarities leading to multiple equilibria and endogenous fluctuations. More recently, Bilbiie, (2019), Cooke and Damianovic (2020), Colciago and Silvestrini (2020), Gutierrez et al (2021) and Hamano and Zanetti (2020) used models with entry and nominal rigidities to study departures from monetary neutrality, the effects of market concentration, the implications of the ZLB, and selection with firm heterogeneity, respectively.

¹¹For more recent evidence supporting a positive response of hours worked to a positive *transitory* productivity shock, see e.g. Peersman and Straub (2009) and Foroni et al (2018). A different recent literature studies the response of the labor *share to demand* shocks under nominal rigidities, e.g. Kaplan and Zoch (2020).

¹²Furthermore, the sector-specific shocks in Guerrieri et al are isomorphic to good-specific "demand" shocks, i.e. disturbances to the utility function. Cesa-Bianchi and Ferrero (2021) quantify empirically the contribution of sectoral shocks to aggregate fluctuations.

tributions emphasize related supply-side mechanisms, such as inter-sectoral linkages and complementarities (Woodford (2020)), unemployment and endogenous growth (Fornaro and Wolf (2020)), input-output network structures (Baqaee and Farhi (2020)), and investment (Basu et al, 2021). We abstract from such features to focus on endogenous entry-exit and its interaction with nominal rigidities.

2 The Entry-Exit Multiplier and Aggregate Demand

In this section, we outline the simplest version of our model of endogenous entry-exit with nominal rigidities, focusing on sticky prices. In all variants, households maximize the expected present value of utility defined over a consumption good C and hours worked L , where total consumption is equal to the output of a final-good sector consisting of a CES aggregate of intermediates. In this simplest version, the utility function is logarithmic in consumption $\ln C_t - \chi \frac{L_t^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi}$. This provides an important benchmark distilling our core mechanism. We then show how our key results hold more generally: with external effects, with a utility function with different income effects on labor, and with arbitrary elasticity of intertemporal substitution (relaxing log utility in consumption). Our full model also incorporates wage rigidity along with price rigidity. We discuss the implications of both types of rigidity in detail later on. For now, price rigidity alone is sufficient to develop the main intuition for our aggregate-demand amplification channel.

2.1 A Simple New Keynesian Model with Endogenous Entry-Exit

At time t , the household consumes C_t , equal to final good production Y_t . The latter is produced using a continuum of intermediate inputs with measure N_t : $Y_t = \left(\int_0^{N_t} y_t(\omega)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} d\omega \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}$, where $\theta > 1$ is the symmetric elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods.¹³ Let $p_t(\omega)$ denote the nominal price of good ω and $P_t = \left(\int_0^{N_t} p_t(\omega)^{1-\theta} d\omega \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}$ the price of the final good. The demand for each intermediate ω is then $y_t(\omega) = (p_t(\omega) / P_t)^{-\theta} Y_t$.

There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, each producing a different intermediate $\omega \in [0, N_t]$. Production requires only one factor, labor, whose productivity is scaled

¹³This specification follows Ethier (1982) and Romer (1987)'s extension of the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. Our results carry through, albeit with some differences in interpretation, to a setup where the CES aggregate is defined over individual varieties in consumption instead.

exogenously by a factor A_t . We model the COVID-19 economic impact as a large negative shock to this productivity term. (In our simple framework, this is identical to a downward shift in labor supply). Output supplied by firm ω is:

$$y_t(\omega) = \begin{cases} A_t l_t(\omega) - f, & \text{if } A_t l_t(\omega) > f \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

where $l_t(\omega)$ is the firm's labor demand and f a fixed per-period cost. Under endogenous (free) entry, this fixed cost determines the number of firms in equilibrium, whereas with no entry (exogenous product variety), it determines the profit share. Cost minimization, taking the wage as given, implies that the real marginal cost is equal to the real wage deflated by productivity W_t/A_t , with $W_t \equiv \tilde{W}_t/P_t$ and $\tilde{W}_t$ the nominal wage.

We consider a symmetric equilibrium with N_t producing firms and drop the ω qualifier. The relative price of intermediates in units of the final good is a key object that captures the aggregate productivity benefit of input variety, also known as "increasing returns to specialization":

$$\rho_t \equiv \frac{p_t}{P_t} = N_t^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}. \quad (1)$$

Variations in the number of intermediates induce changes to endogenous aggregate productivity, an insight that is at the core of all the expanding-variety endogenous growth literature.

Let μ_t denote the firms' markup (potentially time-varying):

$$\mu_t \equiv \frac{\rho_t}{W_t/A_t}. \quad (2)$$

Firm ω profit in period t can be written as:

$$d_t = \frac{p_t}{P_t} y_t - W_t l_t.$$

The household's budget constraint is reflected in the aggregate accounting identity equating expenditures (consumption plus the fixed cost "investment" for all firms) with income (labor in-

come and profits for all firms). That is:

$$C_t + \frac{W_t}{A_t} f N_t = W_t L_t + \left(\frac{p_t}{P_t} - \frac{W_t}{A_t} \right) y_t N_t.$$

Combining the above equations and aggregating across goods, anticipating a symmetric equilibrium, we obtain:

$$Y_t = N_t^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \left(\frac{A_t L_t}{N_t} - f \right). \quad (3)$$

With **endogenous entry-exit**, the number of firms is determined by a zero-profit condition for aggregate profits in every period. Thus, individual firm profits $d_t = 0$ in this symmetric equilibrium. Replacing the firm production function in the expression for profits, equating to zero, and solving, we obtain firm-level labor demand: $l_t = \frac{\mu_t}{\mu_t - 1} \frac{f}{A_t}$.¹⁴

A key equation is *aggregate labor demand*, obtained by aggregating l_t across producers:

$$L_t = \frac{\mu_t}{\mu_t - 1} \frac{f N_t}{A_t}. \quad (4)$$

Combined with the markup rule, this yields:

$$W_t = A_t^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \left(\frac{\mu_t - 1}{\mu_t} \frac{1}{f} L_t \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} \frac{1}{\mu_t}. \quad (5)$$

Three important observations are in order: first, endogenous entry implies that the aggregate labor demand is upward sloping. Its slope is the degree of increasing returns. Second, aggregate labor demand shifts as usual with changes in labor productivity, but that effect is amplified here by the increasing returns; and finally, aggregate labor demand shifts with endogenous changes in markups. The last effect is also present in sticky-price models with fixed entry, even though the endogenous change in markups depends on the equilibrium adjustment in the number of firms.

¹⁴The free-entry, zero-profit condition with per-period fixed costs differs from previous work e.g. Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al (2007, 2012) which used dynamic entry subject to a sunk cost. The purpose of this is to distill the novel channel we focus on here in the simplest framework, and thus maximize the role of extensive margins in the sharpest setup; the main insight about the entry-exit multiplier and comovement of the output gap would transfer to a model with sunk costs (and heterogeneity), even though the diffusion pattern of entry-exit over time would change.

Using the zero-profit condition, aggregate accounting (3) can be written:

$$C_t = Y_t = W_t L_t. \quad (6)$$

The households' choice between consumption and hours yields the standard labor supply:

$$\chi L_t^\varphi = \frac{1}{C_t} W_t. \quad (7)$$

Logarithmic utility in consumption implies that income and substitution effects cancel out: (7) and the resource constraint (6) imply fixed equilibrium hours worked $L_t = \bar{L} = \chi^{-\frac{1}{1+\varphi}}$. This simplifies the algebra and allows us to focus on the core novel channel associated with endogenous entry. We relax this assumption later on.

An important distinction concerns input versus final-good prices and their corresponding inflation rates. We refer to the former as the producer price p and to the latter as the consumer price. Producer-price inflation $1 + \pi_t = p_t/p_{t-1}$ and consumer-price inflation $1 + \pi^C = P_t/P_{t-1}$ are related to the growth in the number of intermediate inputs through (1):

$$\frac{1 + \pi_t}{1 + \pi_t^C} = \left(\frac{N_t}{N_{t-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}. \quad (8)$$

This distinction is particularly important with nominal rigidities because these apply at the *individual* firm-level price p_t . The relevant inflation rate for aggregate demand is *consumer* inflation π_t^C , insofar as it determines the ex-ante real interest rate that governs intertemporal substitution. Indeed, the solution to the household's intertemporal problem is the standard Euler equation for consumption:¹⁵

$$\frac{1}{C_t} = \beta E_t \left(\frac{1 + I_t}{1 + \pi_{t+1}^C} \frac{1}{C_{t+1}} \right). \quad (9)$$

The model is closed by specifying the price-setting equation—delivering a Phillips curve for PPI inflation and a Taylor rule for the nominal interest rate in response to PPI inflation.

¹⁵The full solution also implies a standard transversality condition.

2.2 The Entry-Exit Multiplier: Closed-form Solution

In order to highlight the role of nominal rigidities as starkly as possible, we first consider an extreme form of sticky prices that are indefinitely fixed. Later on, we generalize this to a model with a Phillips curve and Taylor rule and show that our main qualitative results remain unchanged. Under **flexible prices** (superscript F), the endogenous-entry (superscript E) equilibrium (superscript EF), is fully determined by combining (3), (4), (1), and (2). The markup is constant and given by $\mu_t^* = \theta / (\theta - 1)$; The equilibrium is summarized in the top left corner of Table 1. In this equilibrium firm-size is also constant: $y_t^*(\omega) = (\theta - 1)f$; Relative to the no-entry model (also under flexible prices), this is the opposite extreme whereby the economy expands and contracts at the extensive firms/products margin only (with no change in the intensive, firm-size margin).¹⁶

Under **sticky prices** (superscript S_p), we assume momentarily that rather than a Taylor rule setting the nominal interest rate, the central bank sets the amount of nominal expenditure, e.g. money supply M_t . This yields the "quantity equation": $M_t = P_t Y_t$. We adopt this for simplicity, but show in Appendix A that this has exactly the same interpretation as a fixed real rate combined with the Euler equation.¹⁷ Since individual prices are fixed, the relative-price equation is $P_t = \bar{p} N_t^{-\frac{1}{\theta-1}}$, and the markup μ_t is now endogenous and given by (4). The endogenous-entry (superscript ES_p) equilibrium is outlined in the top right corner of Table 1.

Table 1: Closed-Form Nonlinear Solution		
	Flexible Prices (F)	Sticky Prices (S_p)
Endogenous Entry-Exit (E)	$N_t^{EF} = \frac{1}{\theta} \frac{A_t \bar{L}}{f}$ $Y_t^{EF} = \frac{\theta-1}{\theta(\theta f)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}} (A_t \bar{L})^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}$	$N_t^{ES_p} = \frac{A_t \bar{L}}{f} - \frac{M_t}{f \bar{p}}$ $Y_t^{ES_p} = \frac{M_t}{\bar{p}} \left(\frac{A_t \bar{L}}{f} - \frac{M_t}{f \bar{p}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}$
No Entry-Exit (N)	$Y_t^{NF} = A_t \bar{L}$ $M_t = P_t^{NF} Y_t^{NF}$	demand: $Y_t^{NS_p} = \frac{M_t}{\bar{p}}$ supply: $Y_t^{NS_p} = A_t L_t^{NS_p}$

We use lower-case variable names to denote percent deviations from steady state, e.g.

$x_t \equiv \ln X_t - \ln X$, where we assume that steady-state productivity $A = 1$ and steady-state money supply M is chosen across models to equalize steady-state aggregate variables (see Appendix A

¹⁶This feature of the equilibrium is due to the combination of free entry (no sunk-cost delays) and fixed costs' being denominated in the output of the respective intermediate. Deviating from either of these assumptions would generate some adjustment in the intensive margin too.

¹⁷We later on solve the dynamic version of the model with a Phillips curve and Taylor rule that does not entirely neutralize PPI inflation.

for details). Comparing the equilibrium expressions of entry-exit leads to our first core proposition :

Proposition 1 *The Entry-Exit Multiplier.* *The response of the number of firms (entry-exit) N_t to the supply shock A_t is proportionately higher under sticky prices (relative to flexible prices):*

$$\frac{dn_t^{ES_p}}{da_t} = \theta \frac{dn_t^{EF}}{da_t} > \frac{dn_t^{EF}}{da_t}.$$

This is a powerful result that operates in models with entry-exit and nominal rigidities; for example, it is a feature of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007) and Bergin and Corsetti (2008), although it has not been identified or discussed as such. The intuition is very simple and general. With sticky prices, the intensive margin cannot adjust in some key dimension and the extensive margin inefficiently bears all the adjustment. For a productivity decrease, the firm would like to increase its price to keep its scale constant, thus selling the same quantity at a higher price, but cannot (sticky prices). This generates a demand shortage and exit, with each remaining firm hiring more workers, producing more, and ending up "too large"; whereas with flexible prices, there would still be exit but each firm would keep its scale constant.¹⁸ Firms are bigger than they would be absent price rigidities, and there are fewer of them. This is a distortion that increases with the demand elasticity θ . In other words, more intensive-margin adjustment would be desirable, and this is relatively more important when inputs are closer substitutes. This last argument is related to the impact on aggregate output, that we will study next.

We note that the equilibrium is determined by two key equations: 1. endogenous entry-exit, implying zero aggregate profits; and 2. individual profit maximization, implying the pricing condition that marginal cost equal marginal revenue.¹⁹ When (say) a negative exogenous productivity shock hits ($dA < 0$), there is a ceteris paribus decrease in profits for each firm (keeping relative prices ρ fixed). *Free entry-exit* implies the number of firms N goes down to restore the zero-profit condition. Due to increasing returns to specialization, this feeds back into a further—now *endogenous*—fall in aggregate productivity.

¹⁸Note that the effect of productivity on entry-exit is symmetric for positive and negative shocks; as we discuss momentarily, this is no longer true for the effect on aggregate output.

¹⁹A key observation is that the labor market equilibrium is identical under flexible and sticky prices: the real wage and marginal cost change by exactly the same amount.

To find *how much* equilibrium entry-exit occurs, we need to consider the pricing condition. Notice that marginal revenue is given by ρ/μ . Keeping the wage fixed, a productivity fall implies an increase in marginal cost. With flexible prices (at given N), the markup μ is constant and individual prices increase. But the equilibrium response of the *relative* price ρ depends on the extent of entry-exit. Each individual firm contracts its labor demand, *and* there is a lower number of firms (one-to-one with the productivity decrease).

With sticky firm prices, marginal cost and revenue are still equalized. But now when firms' profits go down, they are stuck with prices too low, generating an additional incentive for exit. The markup goes down (it was constant under flex prices), which dampens the fall in individual labor demand. The number of firms, however, falls by more, generates exactly the same aggregate labor demand response. Thus, the relative price falls by more under sticky prices to compensate for the fall in the markup and generates the same real marginal cost (and revenue) regardless of whether prices are flexible or sticky. In other words, the final-good price (CPI) P falls by more under sticky prices.

The above discussion hints that our mechanism is likely to be more relevant and realistic for negative productivity shocks (rather than for positive shocks), given the relative timing of entry and pricing decisions: For a positive shock, an undesirable model feature is that entry happens before individual firms can adjust their price. This can be addressed by introducing a sunk cost, which is lower than the price adjustment cost (see Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz 2007 for an example of that sunk-cost modeling).

Yet for negative productivity shocks, the same criticism has less bind. If firms are stuck with a price too high and a scale too large, a greater proportion of them fail. In case of a big negative shock, if it were possible to redistribute the fall in individual sales (intensive margin), then more firms would survive. But this is not possible, so disproportionately more firms fail. While price stickiness is probably not the most micro-plausible mechanism for this failure of intensive-margin adjustment, the firms' inability to increase prices enough in a slump certainly seems realistic for large and sudden negative productivity shocks. So we take price stickiness as a metaphor for firms' inability to contract even though a large negative profit results in exit. Furthermore, the difficulty of increasing prices to stabilize individual production is likely to apply to *product* (as opposed to *firm*) level, so the exit emphasized here applies as well to multi-product firms dropping

products as it does to the exit of firms.²⁰

We have simplified our model as much as possible to focus on the impact of supply shocks. In so doing, we have adopted a formulation of sticky prices that is too simple to adequately analyze the impact of demand (e.g. monetary) shocks in the presence of endogenous entry and exit. We describe the optimal monetary policy in this simplest version of our model in Appendix A.3. It features a "divine coincidence" result that is analogous to models with no entry-exit but similar price rigidities and policy tools (Blanchard and Gali, 2007): the central bank can replicate the efficient flexible-price level of output while at the same time also stabilizing inflation. However, we postpone an analysis of monetary policy until our full model with both prices and wages is developed in Section 4. For given our current model with only sticky prices, a monetary expansion induces a counterfactual prediction of increased exit. The reason is a well-known feature of the standard NK model: markups and profits are countercyclical to demand shocks. As demand goes up, labor demand shifts up, increasing the real wage and real marginal cost and eroding margins; with free entry, this leads to exit. We show in Section 4 below that extending the model to introduce wage rigidity solves this issue and its monetary policy implications—while also providing a quantitatively powerful amplification mechanism.

2.3 Aggregate-Demand Amplification Through Entry-Exit

When does this entry-exit multiplier of the supply-side productivity shock lead to aggregate demand amplification—a higher response of aggregate output (and consumption)? A key point to note in this context is that N is *linear* in A , but Y is *nonlinear* in A , because $Y(N)$ is nonlinear. It is useful for comparison to review the standard NK model with no entry-exit, with a fixed number of varieties $N_t = \bar{N}$, which we normalize to 1. For reference, we denote throughout variables in the No-Entry-Exit model by the superscript N . Labor supply is still given by (7), but labor demand is simply: $W_t^N = A_t / \mu_t^N$, a special case of (5) with no aggregate productivity benefit to variety. Furthermore, there is now no distinction between producer and consumer prices. Since we normalize the mass of goods to 1, individual and aggregate variables coincide. The production function is $Y_t^N = A_t L_t^N$, where we normalize the fixed cost in the no-entry economy to zero (this is immaterial for our analysis).

²⁰See Argente et al (2018) for recent evidence on the cyclical relevance of this margin.

Under *flexible prices*, optimal pricing implies a constant markup rule $\mu_t^{NF} = \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}$ (the superscript *NF* refers to the No-Entry equilibrium with flexible prices). This implies that the wage is $W_t^{NF} = \frac{\theta-1}{\theta} A_t$, with hours and consumption given by $L_t^{NF} = \bar{L} = \left(\frac{\theta-1}{\theta\chi}\right)^{\frac{1}{1+\varphi}}$ and $Y_t^{NF} = A_t \bar{L}$. Hours are constant in this equilibrium, even though labor supply is endogenous, because income and substitution effects cancel out (a consequence of logarithmic utility in consumption). With *sticky prices* we now have $Y_t^{NS_p} = A_t L_t^{NS_p} = \frac{M_t}{P} \rightarrow L_t^{NS_p} = \frac{M_t}{P} \frac{1}{A_t}$: as long as they stay within the time constraint, hours go up when productivity goes down in order to keep consumption constant at the demand-determined level.²¹ This core intuition of the NK model is at odds with the data.²² For now, we note that this counterfactual prediction disappears in our sticky-price model with endogenous entry-exit, which restores procyclical hours in response to productivity just like under flexible prices. We return to this issue in the dynamic model later on. These closed-form equilibrium solutions for the no-entry model version are recorded in the bottom row of Table 1.

We plot final output Y as a function of the shock A for the two equilibria in the left panel of Figure 1. Since output is demand-determined under flexible prices, it is the upward sloping line with slope $\bar{L}$. Under sticky prices, it is the horizontal line $Y_t^{NS_p} = \frac{M_t}{P}$. We choose the domain of A_t such that there is no rationing. That is, the equilibrium level of output is equal to demand and the adjustment is borne by hours worked. Those hours increase to compensate for the productivity-driven shortfall.²³

The main takeaway is that, in response to a bad supply shock (lower A), output goes down proportionally under flexible prices. But under sticky prices, it either stays unchanged (if labor is elastic enough) or at most falls by as much as under flexible prices: in other words, there is never a demand shortage in response to a negative supply shock, and there can even be excess demand. The "output gap" is positive in response to supply disruptions. This is a well-known property of

²¹Evidently, there is rationing as soon as $\frac{M_t}{P} \frac{1}{A_t}$ becomes larger than the feasible time endowment.

²²The effect on hours is due to income effects. Note that wages and profits are: $W_t^{NS_p} = A_t^{-\varphi} \chi \left(\frac{M_t}{P}\right)^{1+\varphi}$ and $D_t^{NS_p} = (M_t/P) \left(1 - A_t^{-(1+\varphi)} \chi (M_t/P)^{1+\varphi}\right)$. Wages are countercyclical and profits procyclical conditional on supply shocks. In particular, wages go up and profits down in response to a bad shock. Agents work more because of the extra income effect of profits relative to the free-entry ($Y = wL$) case, whereby income and substitution effects cancel out.

²³With a negative enough shock, demand can exceed supply (what can be produced), so the equilibrium amount produced and consumed would be represented by a kinked line (where to the left, the upward-sloping part would be supply-determined). The kink point itself is determined by labor supply elasticity: for instance with inelastic labor, any small negative A shock would lead to rationing. In particular, there is rationing as soon as $\frac{M_t}{P} \frac{1}{A_t} > L^{tot}$ (the total time endowment), which calibrating real money balances to equate the two equilibria at $A = 1$ (in the absence of shocks) delivers $A_t < \frac{\bar{M}}{P} \frac{1}{L^{tot}} = \left(\frac{\theta-1}{\theta\chi}\right)^{\frac{1}{1+\varphi}} \frac{1}{L^{tot}}$.

the standard no-entry sticky-price model restated here as a benchmark.

Consider now the role of endogenous entry and exit. In the right panel of Figure 1, we plot the EF (red dash) and ES (blue solid) equilibria. The economies are again calibrated so that the steady-state equilibria ($A = 1$) coincide, and also coincide with the steady-state of the NF model (see Appendix A for details). The only remaining free parameter is θ , which we set to 3.8, which is a conservative value in line with estimates from the trade literature. As the figure makes clear, output under sticky prices is always lower than under flexible prices. In particular, output falls by more in response to a bad supply shock when prices are sticky. That is, the output gap is negative in response to supply disruptions. Moreover, the larger the disruption, the larger the demand recession, and the more negative the output gap.




Figure 1: CES. Y^{x^F} (flex. prices) red dash, Y^{x^S} (sticky prices) solid blue

To understand what drives this key result that completely overturns the propagation of supply shocks in the no-entry New Keynesian model, we compare those two free-entry equilibria using a second-order approximation around the point $Y^{ES_p} = Y^{EF}$. This leads to our second Proposition. Small letters still denote log deviations, and small letters *with a tilde* denote deviations as a share of the steady-state value, i.e. $\tilde{x}_t \equiv (X_t - X) / X$. Of course, when focusing on a first order approximation this distinction is immaterial, since to first order $\tilde{x}_t \simeq x_t$; but to second order the two are different ($\tilde{x}_t \simeq x_t + \frac{1}{2}x_t^2$).

Proposition 2 *To second order, output under flexible and sticky prices is, respectively:*

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{y}_t^{EF} &\simeq \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}a_t + \frac{1}{2}\frac{\theta}{(\theta-1)^2}a_t^2, \\ \tilde{y}_t^{ES_p} &\simeq \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}a_t + \frac{1}{2}\frac{\theta^2(2-\theta)}{(\theta-1)^2}a_t^2.\end{aligned}\tag{10}$$

Therefore, the "output gap" is:

$$\tilde{y}_t^{ES_p} - \tilde{y}_t^{EF} \simeq -\frac{1}{2}\theta a_t^2.\tag{11}$$

We note that the first order elasticities are identical under flexible and sticky prices. This is because under the CES aggregator, the market equilibrium is Pareto optimal: as in Dixit and Stiglitz, the number of input varieties is efficient. By an envelope argument, first-order deviations from that allocation are negligible (a consequence of the neutrality proposition in Bilbiie (2019)). But the output gap response is always negative, due to the second-order effect. There is also an asymmetry: output increases by less in response to positive shocks, but falls by more in response to negative shocks. For large negative shocks in particular, the response under sticky prices can be substantially larger.

Dissecting the Mechanism. The key to understanding these second-order (concavity) effects lies in the equilibrium dependence of aggregate output to the number of intermediate inputs $Y(N)$. As we already noted, N itself is a linear function of A . In other words, N is (linearly) amplified through our entry-exit multiplier. Y is then amplified further through second-order effects. In particular, consider the "aggregate production function":

$$Y_t = N_t^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \left(\frac{A_t \bar{L}}{N_t} - f \right).\tag{12}$$

A second-order approximation around the steady-state equilibrium yields:

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{y}_t &\simeq \frac{\bar{L} - \theta f N}{(\theta-1)(\bar{L} - fN)}n_t + \frac{1}{2}\frac{(2-\theta)\bar{L} - \theta f N}{(\theta-1)^2(\bar{L} - fN)}n_t^2 \\ &= \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\frac{1 - \frac{N}{N^{EF}}}{\theta - \frac{N}{N^{EF}}}n_t - \frac{1}{2}\frac{\theta}{(\theta-1)^2}\frac{\theta + \frac{N}{N^{EF}} - 2}{\theta - \frac{N}{N^{EF}}}n_t^2 \\ &= -\frac{1}{2}\frac{\theta}{(\theta-1)^2}n_t^2.\end{aligned}\tag{13}$$

The first linear term drops out given that $N = N^{EF} = \bar{L}/\theta f$ (The *steady-state* value is the same as in the efficient flexible-price equilibrium). Thus, the output gap is always zero to a first order. Intuitively, entry implies an adjustment mechanism such that if demand is too high and therefore profits too low (due to sticky prices), some firms exit. This reduces aggregate output through the variety effect, and since variety provision is efficient with CES preferences and flexible prices, output is the same as in the flex-price level to a first order (although the number of varieties is inefficiently small); in other words, the individual per-firm labor demand shifts, but the number of firms moves so as to offset the effect on aggregate labor demand to first order. This is a more general case of the local neutrality result in response to monetary shocks first emphasized in Bilbiie (2019).²⁴

The amplification of exit (lower N) to a negative productivity shock (lower A) thus generates amplification for the fall of real output Y . This effect, which operates through the concavity of consumption in the number of intermediates, is decreasing with the benefit of variety $(\theta - 1)^{-1}$.²⁵ It is thus determined by the same parameter governing the amplification of entry-exit itself. Naturally, when the benefit of variety (the degree of increasing returns to specialization) vanishes there is no curvature of output in the number of varieties. The degree of increasing returns to specialization is crucial for the balance between the extensive and intensive margin adjustment that becomes distorted under sticky prices. More intensive-margin adjustment would be desirable but is unfeasible, and this distortion is *less* important when goods are closer substitutes: θ larger, less returns to scale (less benefit of variety), less distortion. To summarize, θ determines both entry-exit amplification and the concavity distortion, but has opposite effects on these two forces.

Overall, the net effect of θ is to amplify the difference between flexible and sticky-price allocations: the positive effect through the entry-exit multiplier is proportional to θ^2 , while the negative effect through (13) is proportional to θ^{-1} , (i.e. $\theta(\theta - 1)^{-2}$). We disentangle these two forces subsequently, using preferences that break this link between the degree of returns to scale and the elasticity of substitution.

²⁴We show in the Appendix B.2 that this first-order irrelevance result holds more generally for arbitrary price stickiness.

²⁵In Appendix A.3, we provide an alternative interpretation (for an arbitrary degree of price stickiness). We take a second-order approximation to household utility (Woodford, 2003, Chapter 6) delivering a loss function in squared inflation and the gap of the number of firms from its flex-price level (equation (30) therein); replacing the latter equilibrium expressions we obtain the equivalent of Proposition 2 above.

Setting aside this key amplification channel, our model also helps to resolve the well-known controversy between sticky-price (NK) and RBC models in one important dimension: the response of hours worked to productivity shocks. In the former framework, under fixed entry, hours fall in response to positive labor productivity shocks (and increase with negative shocks). This stands in stark contrast with the implications for standard flexible-price, RBC models, whose transmission greatly relies upon (and try hard to match) procyclical hours worked in response to productivity shocks. As our discussion above highlights, the different sticky-price response is driven by an income effect stemming from the response of profits.

It follows immediately that entry and exit, which operate precisely in response to these profit variations, can bring the responses of hours worked in line between the flexible- and sticky-price models. Indeed, it seems a desirable property of a model to deliver a response of hours worked to productivity that is invariant to the largely orthogonal model feature of whether firms can reset prices or not. Our model with entry and exit does that, more closely aligning the responses of hours between the flexible and sticky price versions. In the case of log utility studied here this convergence is extreme: hours are constant in both cases. We show below that for more general preferences with arbitrary income effects this comovement property still holds, with the cyclicity of hours depending on the interplay of income and substitution effects.

3 Generalizations

In this section, we study how our results generalize to more flexible functional forms for preferences over time and across varieties.

3.1 Substitution Across Goods and Over Time: CRRA Utility

We first study the role of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, normalized to one until now by the assumption of logarithmic utility in consumption. Consider the more general CRRA utility in consumption: $U(C_t) = \left(C_t^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}} - 1\right) / \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right)$, with $\ln C_t$ as a limit when $\sigma \rightarrow 1$.

With this change in preferences, the only changes to our model are that the aggregate Euler

equation becomes (in loglinear terms): $c_t = E_t c_{t+1} - \sigma (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}^C)$ and the labor supply equation $\phi l_t = w_t - \sigma^{-1} c_t$. Solving our model under flexible and sticky prices yields the generalization of the entry-exit multiplier (the solution is outlined in the Appendix for the more general case):

$$n_t^{ESp} = \frac{\theta}{\sigma} n_t^{EF}, \quad (14)$$

where the response under flexible prices is $n_t^{EF} = \frac{\sigma(\theta-1)(1+\phi)}{\theta(1+\phi\sigma)-\sigma(1+\phi)} a_t$. Expression (14) illustrates that entry's response under sticky prices is larger than the response under flexible prices if and only if:

$$\theta > \sigma. \quad (15)$$

This is a generalization of the entry-exit multiplier condition under logarithmic utility $\theta > 1$, and is very plausible empirically—since most estimates of the substitution between goods θ are between 4 and 8, while estimates of intertemporal substitution σ are smaller than 2.

The parallel to the logarithmic-utility case goes further: the same condition that governs the entry-exit multiplier (14) is also needed for aggregate demand amplification (i.e. a negative output gap) through second-order terms. We discuss this in further detail in Appendix C.1. The intuition for these results is similar to the one we previously discussed. In response to a negative supply shock, aggregate activity can adjust through two margins: intensive and extensive. With endogenous entry and when the entry-exit multiplier is at work ($\theta > \sigma$), adjustment happens disproportionately at the extensive margin.²⁶

The response of hours worked

Following on our discussion of the response of hours worked under flexible and sticky prices, we can now illustrate that they can be aligned even more closely when we eliminate the income effects on labor supply driving their divergence. In the no-entry-exit model, the response of hours

²⁶The condition (15) is consistent with the requirement found by Guerrieri et al (2020) to generate aggregate-demand recessions in response to (sector-specific) supply shocks, although it may seem *prima facie* the opposite. We focus on the aggregate response comprising both an intensive and an *endogenous* extensive margin, while Guerrieri et al focus on the endogenous response of the intensive margin (in the surviving goods) to an *exogenous* change in the extensive margin. Furthermore, our focus is on the endogenous variations in the set of goods at a highly *disaggregated* level, where substitutability is more plausible; while Guerrieri et al's mechanism pertains to a *sectoral* interpretation wherein complementarity is more plausible. The two mechanisms are mutually compatible and indeed complementary for aggregate amplification. We elaborate on this connection in Appendix C.3.

worked is $l_t^{NF} = (\sigma - 1) / (1 + \varphi\sigma) a_t$ with flexible prices, and is positive whenever income effects are weaker than substitution effects, $\sigma > 1$; whereas it has the opposite sign $l_t^{NS_p} = -a_t$ with sticky prices. This sharply illustrates the dichotomy we previously highlighted. The responses of hours worked under CRRA preferences without external effects (solved for in Appendix C.1) are:

$$l_t^{EF} = l_t^{ES_p} = (\sigma - 1) \frac{\theta}{\theta(1 + \varphi\sigma) - \sigma(1 + \varphi)} a_t, \quad (16)$$

where $\theta > \sigma(1 + \varphi) / (1 + \varphi\sigma)$ is required for technology improvements to be expansionary on output. The response of hours becomes thus positive *ceteris paribus* under both flexible and sticky prices—with entry and exit—as long as income effects are small, namely:

$$\sigma > 1. \quad (17)$$

This makes agents want to work less *ceteris paribus* when wages go up. Indeed, the responses are *identical*, a property of the CES benchmark (we show in the Appendix that for a more general aggregator hours are still procyclical in both cases, but their responses are no longer identical; the same is true under sticky wages, as we show in section 4).²⁷

3.2 External Demand Effects and First-order Amplification

Our benchmark model delivers aggregate-demand amplification only through second-order terms. This second extension is an example that adds a first-order amplification channel (next, we will show that wage stickiness also generates first-order amplification). We consider a generalized CES aggregator reflecting the presence of external returns in intermediate input variety: we assume that the mass of input varieties contributes directly to aggregate productivity in addition to its indirect impact via the standard CES aggregator (we go back to logarithmic utility in consumption for simplicity but treat the case of CRRA and external effects for full generality in Appendix C.1). The production function for the final good is then:

$$Y_t = N_t^\lambda \left(\int_0^{N_t} y_t(\omega)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} d\omega \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}, \quad (18)$$

²⁷In Appendix C.4, we solve the model under preferences that eliminate income effects altogether (called "GHH", from Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman) and show that similar results hold.

where $\lambda > 0$ parameterizes the degree of external returns to variety (we assume that this externality is positive). The returns to variety are therefore magnified by this externality relative to the standard CES aggregator. We use this functional form for tractability, but our results generalize easily to non-CES homothetic aggregators as we show in Appendix C.5.²⁸ The final good price is now $P_t = N_t^{-\lambda} \left(\int_0^{N_t} p_t(\omega)^{1-\theta} d\omega \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}$, and the relative price (replacing equation (1) above) is: $\rho_t \equiv p_t/P_t = N_t^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}}$. Crucially for our results, the benefit of an additional input is now $\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}$ and is thus no longer aligned with the producers' profit incentive to provide that variety—the net markup. The aggregate accounting equation (3) is now $Y_t = N_t^{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \left(\frac{A_t \bar{L}_t}{N_t} - f \right)$, leading to similar changes to aggregate labor demand (5) and to the relationship between PPI and CPI inflation (8).²⁹

The equilibrium number of firms is unchanged under both flexible and sticky prices, since it is determined by markups, which govern the incentive for entry. It follows that the entry-exit multiplier we previously uncovered remains unchanged. But the equilibrium values of output change respectively to:

$$Y_t^{EF} = \left(\frac{1}{\theta f} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} (A_t \bar{L})^{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}; \quad Y_t^{ES_p} = \frac{M_t}{\bar{p}} \left(\frac{A_t \bar{L}}{f} - \frac{M_t}{f \bar{p}} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}}. \quad (19)$$

A key property of models with endogenous entry under general input aggregation is that the equilibrium amount of entry may be inefficient. In our model, the wedge between the flexible-price market equilibrium and a Pareto optimal level chosen by a planner N_t^{opt} is given by $\frac{N_t^{opt}}{N_t^{EF}} = 1 + \lambda \frac{\theta-1}{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}$. It follows that the market number of firms is inefficiently low whenever $\lambda > 0$, as we have assumed.³⁰ Since the number of varieties is inefficiently low and its elasticity with respect to productivity shocks is also inefficiently low, a mechanism that provides a magnification of the response of entry to productivity shocks will yield first-order welfare improvements: this is indeed the case for our entry-exit multiplier.

To understand the amplification properties of the model under external returns, we take a

²⁸For aggregates of individual varieties of consumption goods, this is akin to assuming an arbitrary benefit of variety $\lambda + 1/(\theta - 1)$ as in the working paper version of Dixit and Stiglitz and further elaborated in i.a. Benassy (1996), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2007), Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2019).

²⁹The insights from the nonlinear model also apply to the general CES aggregator with external effects, subject to some qualifications described in Appendix A.5.

³⁰The planner solution is found by maximizing the number of goods subject to technology and resource constraints only; see Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2019) for a detailed analysis of the welfare implications of entry, variety, and markups.

second-order approximation of the equilibrium value of consumption, obtaining Proposition (3) (the derivation is in the Appendix):

Proposition 3 *To second order, output under flexible and sticky prices is, respectively:*

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{y}_t^{EF} &= \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\right) a_t + \frac{1}{2} \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}\right) \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\right) a_t^2, \\ \tilde{y}_t^{ES_p} &= \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}\right) \theta a_t + \frac{1}{2} \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}\right) \left(\left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}\right) - 1\right) \theta^2 a_t^2.\end{aligned}\quad (20)$$

Therefore, the output gap is:

$$\tilde{y}_t^{ES_p} - \tilde{y}_t^{EF} = \lambda (\theta - 1) a_t + \frac{1}{2} \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}\right) [\lambda (\theta^2 - 1) + \theta - \theta^2] a_t^2. \quad (21)$$

To help intuition, it is useful again to take a second-order approximation of consumption as a function of the number of varieties, yielding:

$$\tilde{y}_t \simeq \lambda n_t + \frac{1}{2} \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}\right) \left(\lambda - \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}\right) n_t^2. \quad (22)$$

The *first-order* response of the output gap to a negative supply shock $d(-a_t)$ with endogenous entry is $-\lambda (\theta - 1)$ and is thus negative. The combination of an inefficiently low (and inelastic) number of firms with the entry-exit multiplier, which increases the responsiveness of the number of firms to productivity shocks under sticky prices, translates into first-order aggregate demand amplification. As (22) makes clear, there is a first-order welfare benefit to expanding the number of firms. This first-order amplification generalizes to the model with an Euler equation, Phillips curve, and Taylor rule; in Appendix B, we outline a loglinearized model that is isomorphic to the textbook NK no-entry model and is amenable to an aggregate demand-aggregate supply analysis.

The equilibrium responses are also different to second order and, importantly, we can now disentangle the effects of input variety from the demand elasticity, which were convoluted under CES preferences. The second-order term in (22) illustrates that Y is concave in N whenever $\lambda < \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}$. This disentangles the effect of the curvature of output in the degree of returns to scale from that of the elasticity of substitution, discussed after Proposition 2. *Ceteris paribus*, Y is more concave the smaller the degree of returns to specialization $\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}$ and the smaller the elasticity of substitution

θ —but the former effect dominates. For the benchmark CES aggregator, the overall effect is that a higher θ makes Y more concave because, implicitly, it reduces the degree of increasing returns.

4 The Full Model: Entry, and Price and Wage Rigidity

We now develop our full model that combines both sticky prices and wages—along with the preference generalizations we just analyzed. We show how such a model, along with endogenous entry-exit is able to replicate a whole series of business-cycle comovements—along with a quantitatively substantial aggregate-demand amplification channel with both first-order and second-order effects. The first-order effects arise naturally from the addition of wage stickiness. And the addition of sticky wages also eliminates the counterfactual predictions for monetary demand shocks with respect to entry that we previously described, and thus allows us to fully address the impact of those shocks. Yet, we also show how sticky wages on their own cannot generate the key aggregate-demand amplification that arises with sticky prices. This is why we started with a simpler model with just that single nominal rigidity in order to highlight the key intuition underlying that mechanism.

Nominal rigidities take the form of (Rotemberg) quadratic adjustment costs for both prices and wages, delivering standard Phillips curves for both prices and wages.³¹ The full model derivations are relegated to Appendix D. They include the case with demand externalities, and thus nest all the previous models we have studied.

4.1 The Full Model: Supply and Demand Shocks

We now quantitatively illustrate how the addition of sticky wages generates these first and second order effects that we just described. Consider a baseline parameterization with values that are commonly used in the New Keynesian literature: Elasticity of substitution between goods of $\theta = 3.8$, a CRRA coefficient of $\sigma^{-1} = 0.5$, unit labor supply elasticity $\varphi = 1$, a price adjustment cost parameter κ delivering a first-order Phillips curve slope of 0.01, a Taylor rule responding to PPI

³¹We model wage stickiness in a standard way with a quadratic cost parametrization for nominal wages adjustments by a “labor union”, which bundles the differentiated labor types of a unit mass of households, giving rise to a standard nonlinear “wage Phillips” curve (we follow the classic references on wage rigidity, Erceg et al, 2000; and Schmidt-Grohé and Uribe, 2006). In the limit as the adjustment cost increases, we recover the case of fixed nominal wages, which we can fully solve analytically, without linearization.

inflation with response 1.5. Finally, in the case of sticky wages, we assume the same elasticity of substitution for labor types as for goods ($\theta_w = 3.8$; this parameter is largely inconsequential) and the same stickiness parameter as for prices $\kappa_w = \kappa$ (wage Phillips curve slope 0.01).

Supply shocks

In Figure 2, upper panel 2a, we plot the dynamic equilibrium responses of key macroeconomic variables in our nonlinear model to a 2% fall in productivity with persistence 0.5 under flexible prices (red dash) and under sticky prices and wages (solid blue). The output gap plots the difference between the two respective output values.³²


In our baseline case plotted in Figure 2a, the number of firms/products drops by 11.3% and this is now associated with a 4.2% output gap. As we show below, this is more than two orders of magnitude higher than under sticky prices only. These large magnitudes are the result of the new first-order effects we mentioned. We characterize those analytically below. In Appendix D, we also solve the nonlinear model under a special case (fixed prices and wages) and analytically describe the combined first-order and higher-order effects.

This aggregate-demand recession in response to a negative supply shock (i.e., a negative output gap relative to the flexible equilibrium) is entirely driven by the extensive margin response.³³ In order to further illustrate the key role played by endogenous product variety, we show the same impulse responses for the (nonlinear) model when product variety is exogenous (no entry-exit) in panel 2b of Figure 2. In that panel, we replace the response for the (fixed) number of firms with the response for profits. It illustrates the stark contrast in the response of hours under nominal rigidities between our full model (top panel) and the standard NK model with no entry-exit (bottom panel). As we previously discussed, the bottom panel shows how hours respond *positively* to a negative productivity shock in the standard NK model—whereas hours respond *negatively* in our model with endogenous product variety. This divergence in the response of hours directly leads to the critical divergence in the response of the output gap: negative in our model, whereas it is positive when product variety is exogenous.

³²The responses are produced by solving the full model globally using Dynare's nonlinear perfect-foresight solver (Adjemian et al, 2011). We plot PPI inflation and nominal interest only for the sticky model since their flex-price (and-wage) magnitudes are so large that they dwarf the sticky-price responses.

³³Note that this amplification can also be reinterpreted in terms of "unemployment", following Galí (2013): hours under sticky wages (and prices) go down by more than in the flexible equilibrium, so there is under-employment.

(2a): Endogenous Entry



(2b): No Entry




Fig. 2: Effects of a 2% productivity fall: Flexible (red dash) vs Sticky (solid blue) prices & wages

In addition, the combination of price and wage stickiness is also critical in delivering the quantitatively substantial 4.2% output gap show in Figure 2 (in response to a 2% drop in productivity). To illustrate this, we show the response in the number of firms/products and output gap that

would result from the non-linear model with only price stickiness (for an otherwise identical parameterization) in Table 2. The second row shows that the magnitude of the output gap would be well over 2 orders of magnitude lower! Incorporating demand-side externalities substantially raises the output gap magnitudes for both versions of nominal rigidities, but the massive difference between the two versions persists (see the bottom half of Table 2). The magnitude of the output gap under both price and wage rigidities nearly doubles to 7.6% when there are also demand-side externalities—even under a relatively small external effect parameter $\lambda = 0.1$. This further increases the economic consequences of our aggregate-demand amplification channel in our full model with both price and wage rigidity (though the consequences were already substantial even without the demand externality).³⁴ Intuitively, the demand-externality and sticky-wage distortions lead to inefficient entry and generate first-order welfare effects through our “entry-exit multiplier”. But combining both distortions induces an interaction effect that generates an even higher welfare impact relative to each distortion on its own.

Table 2: Responses under different calibrations (%)

	dn_t	$d(y_t - y_t^{EF})$
<i>da_t = −2%</i>		
Sticky P and W	−11.3	−4.2
Sticky P only	−5.61	−0.025
<i>With demand-side externality</i>		
Sticky P and W	−13	−7.6
Sticky P only	−5.26	−0.33

Although wage stickiness is a key ingredient for the quantitative amplification of our “entry-exit multiplier”, it is not sufficient on its own—without the combination with price stickiness—to induce the aggregate-demand amplification of supply disruptions. In Appendix D.3, we derive and solve analytically a version of our model with only sticky wages and show a similar set of

³⁴In contrast, the equilibrium response of the number of firms is not significantly affected by the demand externality; this is because it is governed by the markup, which is unaffected by the presence of externalities (which only affects the benefit of variety and thus the aggregate welfare response).

impulse responses. There is no persistent aggregate-demand amplification when prices are flexible because firms can re-establish their profitability by adjusting prices. This induces a persistent expansion, positive output gap, and deflation as work hours increase in order to smooth the nominal wage. With sticky prices, hours stay below their flexible level but with flexible prices firms can re-establish their profitability by adjusting prices, which undoes the amplification. There is a persistent deflation from next period onwards as firms cut prices to stay profitable. In essence, price stickiness is a key ingredient because it delivers the persistent profitability drop that endogenously generates exit and the associated (persistent) demand amplification.

Demand shocks

The addition of sticky wages in our full model also delivers realistic responses to demand shocks. We consider the responses to a one-time interest rate cut. They are plotted in Figure 3 in solid blue. We have added in dashed green the impulse responses for the earlier version of our model without sticky wages (only sticky prices). In that case, we see how the demand shock induces exit. As we previously discussed, this counterfactual prediction is driven by the sharp drop in the markup, and hence profits (per firm). When wages are flexible, the increase in labor demand translates directly into an increase in the nominal wage—with the ensuing negative consequences for firm profitability and exit.

However, this counterfactual prediction is overturned once we add sticky wages. Then, the increase in labor demand is accommodated by increased entry. This provides workers with real consumption gains at a given nominal wage—and thus substitutes for the sharp increase in nominal wages, which is no longer feasible. In other words, when both nominal wages and individual prices are sticky, the consumption good price index P_t must fall to induce a rise in the real wage—and this occurs via entry, dampening the fall in markups. Recall that when wages are sticky, entry is inefficiently low. The positive monetary shock can then boost real output by offsetting this inefficiency. This intuition also has implications for the optimal design of monetary policy in our model.




Fig. 3: Endogenous Entry. Effects of 1% interest rate cut: Sticky P only (green dots) vs Sticky P & W (solid blue)

In the fixed-entry model, the countercyclicality of markups in response to demand shocks implies that profits are countercyclical too under flexible wages. This is a well-known issue of sticky-price (only) New Keynesian models, for which wage stickiness is an equally well-known solution making profits procyclical.³⁵ We report the impulse responses of the no-entry model for completion in Figure A4 in Appendix.

4.2 Analytical Insights and Monetary Policy Implications

We now provide some analytical results for a special case of our full model in the limiting case of "full" nominal rigidities: the nominal price and wage level cannot be changed. We derive the first and second order approximations and use those to characterize the optimal policy response to a negative productivity shock. In line with our quantitative predictions for the impact of both productivity and monetary policy shocks, we find that the policymaker can close the negative output gap generated by the negative productivity shock by easing monetary policy.

³⁵The cyclical properties of profits have nontrivial (and sometimes perverse) aggregate-demand implications through distributional mechanisms in models with heterogeneous agents, see e.g. Bilbiie (2008, 2020). Wage stickiness helps alleviate some of those issues, as discussed recently e.g. by Broer et al (2020).

Supply shocks: analytics

In the limiting case with fixed prices and wages, the responses of the number of firms and output to productivity shocks a_t are (using superscript S_{pw} to denote price *and* wage stickiness):

$$\frac{dn_t^{ES_{pw}}}{da_t} = \frac{\theta(\theta - 1)}{\theta - \sigma}; \frac{dy_t^{EP_{pw}}}{da_t} = \frac{\theta\sigma}{\theta - \sigma} \quad (23)$$

Compared to the corresponding responses in the flexible-prices-and-wages case, there is now a negative output gap in response to negative TFP shocks as long as:

$$\theta > \sigma > 1. \quad (24)$$

This is once again the empirically relevant case where the elasticity of substitution between good varieties is higher than the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. Furthermore, this joint condition (24) is exactly the same that we derived in the flexible-wage model to deliver an entry multiplier and aggregate demand amplification ($\theta > \sigma$ in (15)) and also procyclical hours ($\sigma > 1$ in (17)). Finally, the response of hours worked is:

$$\frac{dl_t^{ES_{pw}}}{da_t} = (\sigma - 1) \frac{\theta}{\theta - \sigma}. \quad (25)$$

Thus, condition (24) also ensures that hours are procyclical. Indeed, hours respond more than under flexible prices and wages—so there is "unemployment" in the Gali sense—as long as labor is not perfectly elastic ($\varphi > 0$).³⁶ We also obtain this prediction in Figure 2a with the quantitative version of our model based on quadratic nominal adjustment costs.

And just as we emphasized for that quantitative version with no entry (see Figure 2b), these effects are entirely due to the endogenous entry-exit margin, rather than the presence of sticky prices and wages. We can further confirm this analytically in the no-entry version of the model when both prices and wages are fixed. Output is then invariant to productivity shocks and hours

³⁶The gap between sticky and flexible-wage hours worked is in particular (with fixed prices and both cases):

$$\frac{d(l_t^{ES_{pw}} - l_t^{ES_p})}{da_t} = (\sigma - 1) \varphi \sigma \frac{\theta}{\theta - \sigma} \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta(1 + \varphi\sigma) - \sigma(1 + \varphi)}$$

are countercyclical $dy_t^{NS_{pw}}/da_t = 0$ and $dl_t^{NS_{pw}}/da_t = -1$.³⁷

Demand shocks and monetary policy implications

In this version with fixed prices and wages, the responses of entry and output to a one-time interest rate cut ε_t are:

$$\frac{dn_t^{ES_{pw}}}{d\varepsilon_t} = \frac{\sigma(\theta - 1)}{\theta - \sigma}; \quad \frac{dy_t^{ES_{pw}}}{d\varepsilon_t} = \frac{\theta\sigma}{\theta - \sigma}. \quad (26)$$

As discussed above, expansionary monetary policy now triggers entry and is expansionary on aggregate activity. Conditional on both shocks, the output gap is:

$$y_t^{ES_{pw}} - y_t^{EF} = \frac{\theta\sigma}{\theta - \sigma} \theta \frac{\varphi(\sigma - 1)}{\theta(1 + \varphi\sigma) - \sigma(1 + \varphi)} a_t + \frac{\theta\sigma}{\theta - \sigma} \varepsilon_t. \quad (27)$$

Indeed, the central bank can use an expansionary policy (an interest rate cut ε_t) to completely close the output gap with respect to the flexible equilibrium—which is efficient by virtue of efficient entry. The exact value for this cut that closes the output gap is:

$$d\varepsilon_t^* = (\sigma - 1) \frac{\theta}{(\theta - \sigma)\varphi^{-1} + \sigma(\theta - 1)} d(-a_t). \quad (28)$$

An interest rate cut $d\varepsilon_t^* > 0$ is optimal in response to a negative supply shock $da_t < 0$ (given the assumption that $\sigma > 1$).³⁸

In contrast, in the no-entry version, the optimal response is a contractionary policy (because the output gap itself is positive): $d\varepsilon_t^{*N} = \frac{1+\varphi}{1+\varphi\sigma} da_t$. Thus, it is critical to account for the endogenous entry margin—that entry responds to profits—when considering optimal monetary policy responses to supply disruptions.

³⁷Under flexible prices and wages output is $dy_t^{NF}/da_t = \sigma(1 + \varphi)/(1 + \sigma\varphi)$; hours are $dl_t^{NF}/da_t = (\sigma - 1)/(1 + \sigma\varphi)$ and may be procyclical if income effects are weak $\sigma > 1$, but the output gap is always negative.

³⁸We show in Appendix D.1 that this insight translates to the optimal policy problem solved non-linearly, which delivers this first-order effect as well as second-order terms implying a monetary policy easing in response to the negative shock even in the absence of first-order terms (i.e. under logarithmic utility).

5 Conclusion

The responses of entry-exit to adverse supply shocks like the recent COVID-19 crisis are amplified by firms' inability to increase their prices, which leads to additional losses for individual firms. This in turn amplifies the response of exit relative to a flexible-price benchmark. We call this simple mechanism *the entry-exit multiplier*, and we show that it operates in a wide range of models with endogenous entry-exit and nominal rigidities.

This "supply-side" amplification further induces an aggregate-demand recession; that is a fall in output under nominal rigidities that is larger than the fall in its flexible-price counterpart: a negative output gap.

We show that the only "necessary ingredients" for this aggregate demand amplification are endogenous entry/exit and sticky good prices. However, the quantitative relevance of this amplification channel in this simplest model is small; and this model is further not well-suited to realistically consider responses to changes in monetary policy. We then show how the addition of sticky wages addresses both of these concerns: The quantitative magnitude for the key amplification channel rises by over 2 orders of magnitude; and the counterfactual predictions regarding some responses to monetary policy shocks disappear. We can then analyze how an expansionary monetary policy can be used to dampen—and when optimally chosen, eliminate—the negative output gap induced by supply disruptions.

In terms of our demand-side (utility) assumptions, we find that those key amplification channels and the associated monetary policy responses only rely on the empirically accepted benchmark that the elasticity of substitution (typically in the range between 4 and 8) is higher than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for the consumption aggregate (typically below 2). We mostly rely on the benchmark CES aggregator, which entails that the market level of product variety (entry) is efficient in the flexible-price model version. This efficiency property is then broken by the addition of sticky wages, and we show how this then induces first-order amplification effects via our entry-exit multiplier (when only prices are sticky, the amplification effects are only second-order). We also show how the further addition of demand externalities—deviating from CES preferences with a positive externality for higher product variety—then adds another channel for first-order amplification of the entry-exit multiplier. Quantitatively, we show that, under

our baseline parameterization and with a small external effect of one quarter of the steady-state markup, this further doubles the magnitude for the output gap.

Another potential empirical advantage of our model pertains to its business-cycle properties: the (sign of the) response of hours worked to supply shocks is largely invariant to price stickiness. This solves a well-known controversy between the standard RBC and NK models. In their baseline versions, they generate diametrically opposed employment responses: under sticky prices, hours worked fall after a positive supply shock. With endogenous entry-exit in addition to sticky prices, hours worked increase following a transitory productivity increase—just as in standard RBC models.

The conclusion of our analysis is that New Keynesian models should be updated to include endogenous entry-exit—in addition to both sources of nominal rigidities, sticky prices and wages—in order to generate reasonable macroeconomic fluctuations and thus serve as a guide to analyze and design stabilization policies.

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A Derivations for Nonlinear Benchmark Model

A.1 Equivalence of quantity equation and Euler equation with fixed real rate

We show that the quantity, money-supply rule considered in text is equivalent to the more standard Euler equation with an interest rate rule fixing the real rate (or with fixed prices). Consider for generality the case of CRRA utility (used later in the paper) $U = \left(C^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}} - 1\right) / \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right)$. Labor is inelastic for simplicity.

Now the "quantity equation" becomes, assuming that M enters utility logarithmically,

$$C_t^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \frac{M_t}{P_t}$$

Note: a policy whereby the central bank fixes M is equivalent to a policy whereby it fixes the (relative-to-PPI) real interest rate. Our previous work (Bilbiie Ghironi Melitz 2007) shows that PPI is the right object to target with price stickiness. Recall $1 + \pi_t = p_t / p_{t-1}$ and $1 + \pi^C = P_t / P_{t-1}$:

$$\frac{1 + \pi_t}{1 + \pi_t^C} = \left(\frac{N_t}{N_{t-1}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}.$$

The aggregate-demand relevant object, however, is the CPI π_t^C which matters for intertemporal substitution. Households' standard Euler equation is (take perfect foresight, no expectation):

$$C_t^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \beta \frac{1 + I_t}{1 + \pi_{t+1}^C} C_{t+1}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}.$$

Replace CPI inflation definition

$$C_t^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \beta \left(\frac{N_{t+1}}{N_t}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} \frac{1 + I_t}{1 + \pi_{t+1}} C_{t+1}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}.$$

Now assume that the Taylor rule is such that it neutralizes expected PPI inflation entirely (it fixes the real rate with respect to it), i.e. $\frac{1+I_t}{1+\pi_{t+1}} = \beta^{-1}$. The same holds if individual prices p are fixed. Then we have:

$$C_t^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} N_t^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} = C_{t+1}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} N_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} = \text{constant}$$

This is clearly identical to a model with fixed M and fixed prices. In the model with fixed variety,

$C_t^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = C_{t+1}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \text{constant}$ is the same as $C_t^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \frac{M_t}{P_t} = \text{constant}$.

In the model with variety and fixed individual $\bar{p}$, we have $P_t = \bar{p} N_t^{-\frac{1}{\theta-1}}$. So fixed-money rule delivers $C_t^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} N_t^{-\frac{1}{\theta-1}} = \frac{M_t}{\bar{p}} = \text{constant}$, which is exactly the same as the fixed-real-rate rule.

We work with the former for simplicity, but the reader can bear in mind throughout that this has exactly the same interpretation as a fixed real rate. We then solve the dynamic version of the model with a Phillips curve and Taylor rule that does not entirely neutralize PPI inflation.

A.2 Calibration equalizing steady states across models

In Figure 1, we choose the fixed cost f in order to make models consistent in the steady state, when the shock is absent $A = 1$; i.e. we pick f that equalizes Y^{EF} to Y^{NF} , $\theta f = \bar{L} \left(\frac{\theta-1}{\theta} \right)^{\theta-1}$. Then, we choose money supply M to equalize the SP equilibrium Y^{ES_p} with FE to this same $Y^{EF} = Y^{NF}$. This requires, using f :

$$Y = \frac{\theta-1}{\theta} \left(\frac{\bar{L}}{f} - \frac{M_t}{f\bar{p}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} = \bar{L} \rightarrow \frac{M}{\bar{p}} = \bar{L} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta} \right)$$

So for the free entry-exit (E) model we plot, for the sticky-price S case, replacing $f = \frac{\bar{L}}{\theta} \left(\frac{\theta-1}{\theta} \right)^{\theta-1}$ and $\frac{M}{\bar{p}} = \bar{L} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta} \right)$

$$Y_t^{ES_p} = \bar{L} (\theta A_t - \theta + 1)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}$$

and for flex-price F:

$$Y_t^{EF} = A_t^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \bar{L}.$$

While with no entry N (left panel) we plot $Y_t^{NF} = A_t \bar{L}$ and $Y_t^{NS} = \frac{M}{\bar{p}}$.

A.3 Stabilization Policy Implications

As our discussion at page 14 anticipated, the simplest, stripped-down version of our model is unsuitable for studying monetary policy or demand shocks; we postpone a detailed discussion of this to section (4). Here, we nevertheless prove a "divine coincidence" result analogous to fixed-entry economies (Blanchard and Gali, 2007): the central bank can replicate the efficient flexible-price level of output while at the same time *also* stabilizing inflation (in a version where prices are

not fixed but arbitrarily sticky).³⁹

This can be seen directly by replacing the free-entry condition written for arbitrarily sticky prices, as a function of the markup (4) into the aggregate accounting equation (3), obtaining (assuming log utility in consumption without loss of generality, so that hours are constant at $\bar{L}$):

$$Y_t = \frac{1}{\mu_t} \left[\frac{1}{f} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mu_t} \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} (A_t \bar{L})^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}. \quad (29)$$

It follows directly that stabilizing the markup at its flexible-price level $\mu^* = \theta / (\theta - 1)$ and thus eliminating inflation in individual prices, delivers the flexible-price level of real activity Y_t^{EF} in Table 1, or vice versa: there is no conflict between the two objectives, i.e. "divine coincidence".

This can be further illustrated by taking a second-order approximation to household utility, following e.g. Woodford (2003, Chapter 6). The derivation, described in the Appendix A.4 (for the benchmark case of log utility in consumption that isolates our channel) delivers the quadratic loss function:

$$\mathcal{L}_t^E \simeq -\frac{1}{2} \left[\kappa \pi_t^2 + \frac{\theta}{(\theta - 1)^2} (n_t - n_t^{EF})^2 \right], \quad (30)$$

capturing the costs of (squared) individual-prices inflation (κ is the Rotemberg adjustment-cost coefficient) and the gap of the number of firms relative to the flexible-price level. The latter is a sufficient statistic for the welfare loss, due to the local neutrality result emphasized above: output is equal to the first order to flexible-price output, but it is different to the second order because of the extensive-margin concavity effects discussed above. Replacing the equilibrium expressions of n_t (under fixed prices, so for $\pi_t = 0$) and n_t^{EF} , we obtain exactly the second-order approximation of the output gap in Proposition 2 above.

This welfare criterion can be used to assess the implications of different, suboptimal policy rules. For example, the suboptimal rule of fixing the money supply (or, with fixed prices, the real interest rate) "costs" $L_t^E = -\frac{1}{2} \theta a_t^2$ in the endogenous-entry model; while in the fixed-entry model (where the loss function is readily derived in e.g. Woodford, 2003; or Galí, 2008), it is $L_t^N = -\frac{1}{2} (1 + \varphi) a_t^2$, where φ is the inverse labor elasticity. This illustrates that the models are not directly comparable (they are not nested in one another); the welfare costs are determined

³⁹We are grateful to an anonymous referee who suggested both emphasizing this property and the connection with the second-order welfare approximation.

by different features of the economy—the benefit of variety and elasticity of substitution, in the former case; and labor elasticity, in the latter. Furthermore, while the fixed-monetary-policy rule is suboptimal in response to negative productivity shocks and thus costly in both economies, its underlying implications are radically different: a positive output gap under fixed entry, but a negative output gap in our free-entry economy. This is the key takeaway of our benchmark model.⁴⁰

A.4 Second-order approximation to utility

Note that we approximate around the steady state of the FP equilibrium (which is the same as for the SP equilibrium) with $N^{EF} = \frac{A\bar{L}}{f\theta}$ and $C^{EF} = (N^{EF})^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} (A\bar{L} - N^{EF}f) = (N^{EF})^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} \frac{\theta-1}{\theta} A\bar{L}$. A second-order approximation to utility around this steady state (which, by virtue of free entry, is efficient) delivers:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{U}_t &\equiv U(C_t, L_t) - U(C, L) \simeq U_C C \frac{C_t - C}{C} + U_L L \frac{L_t - L}{L} + \frac{1}{2} U_{CC} C^2 \left(\frac{C_t - C}{C} \right)^2 + U_{LL} L^2 \left(\frac{L_t - L}{L} \right)^2 \\ &= U_C C \left[c_t + \frac{1 - \sigma^{-1}}{2} c_t^2 \right] + U_L L \left[l_t + \frac{1 + \varphi}{2} l_t^2 \right] + t.i.p + O(\|\zeta\|^3),\end{aligned}$$

where small letters denote again log-deviations from the steady state $c_t \equiv \log \frac{C_t}{C}$ and we used

$$\frac{C_t - C}{C} \simeq c_t + \frac{1}{2} c_t^2,$$

and same for L_t . Finally, *t.i.p* are terms independent of policy and $O(\|\zeta\|^3)$ groups all terms of order 3 or higher.

Next, note that we focus here on the simple case of logarithmic utility in consumption $\sigma = 1$, implying that hours worked are always fixed in equilibrium (regardless of price stickiness and regardless of monetary policy). Therefore, the second term in the approximation drops out (this allows us to focus on the entry channel that is of the essence here). Furthermore, the term in

⁴⁰ Another possibility is that the policymaker stabilizes output at the flex-price level of the no-entry economy. This is evidently costly in the free-entry economy, for there is a first-order, linear term distortion too. In particular, the gap between the flex-price output of the fixed-entry economy and the efficient free-entry equilibrium, approximated to second order, is:

$$y_t^{NF} - y_t^{EF} \simeq -\frac{1}{\theta-1} a_t - \frac{1}{2} \frac{\theta}{(\theta-1)^2} a_t^2.$$

squared consumption deviations c_t^2 also drops out since $\sigma = 1$, so we are left with the linear term—that we nevertheless need to approximate to *second* order.

Taking a second-order approximation of the aggregate production function/resource constraint:

$$C_t = \left(1 - \frac{\kappa}{2} \pi_t^2\right) N_t^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} (A_t L_t - N_t f)$$

around the steady-state using that hours are always constant in equilibrium and denoting by $\delta_t = -\ln \left(1 - \frac{\psi}{2} \pi_t^2\right)$ the inflation welfare cost (which we then approximate to second order below):

$$\begin{aligned} C_t &\simeq C - N^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} (L - Nf) \delta_t + \left(\left(\frac{1}{\theta-1} \right) N^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}-1} (\bar{L} - Nf) - N^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} f \right) (N_t - N) \\ &\quad + N^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} L (A_t - A) + \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{\theta-1} \left(\frac{1}{\theta-1} - 1 \right) N^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}-2} (\bar{L} - Nf) \right. \\ &\quad \left. - \frac{1}{\theta-1} N^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}-1} f - \frac{1}{\theta-1} N^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}-1} f \right) (N_t - N)^2 \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{\theta-1} N^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}-1} \bar{L} (N_t - N) (A_t - A) \end{aligned}$$

and writing with percentage deviations (recall $A = 1$ by normalization):

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{C_t - C}{C} &= -\delta_t + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \frac{N^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \left(\frac{\bar{L}}{N} - \theta f \right)}{C} \frac{N_t - N}{N} + \frac{N^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} L}{C} \frac{A_t - A}{A} \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{\theta-1} \frac{N^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \left(\left(\frac{1}{\theta-1} - 1 \right) \left(\frac{\bar{L}}{N} - f \right) - 2f \right)}{C} \left(\frac{N_t - N}{N} \right)^2 \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \frac{N^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} \bar{L}}{C} \frac{N_t - N}{N} \frac{A_t - A}{A} \end{aligned}$$

Use the steady-state, replacing $N = \frac{\bar{L}}{f\theta}$ and noticing that the 1st order term disappears:

$$\frac{C_t - C}{C} = -\delta_t + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \frac{A_t - A}{A} - \frac{1}{2} \frac{\theta}{(\theta-1)^2} \left(\frac{N_t - N}{N} \right)^2 + \frac{\theta}{(\theta-1)^2} \frac{N_t - N}{N} \frac{A_t - A}{A}$$

Finally, using the second-order approximation of the resource cost of inflation $\delta_t \simeq \frac{1}{2} \kappa \pi_t^2$ and the expression of the flexible-price number of firms $n_t^{EF} = a_t$ and ignoring terms independent of

policy and of order higher than 2, the loss function is proportional to

$$-\frac{1}{2} \left(\kappa \pi_t^2 + \frac{\theta}{(\theta-1)^2} (n_t - n_t^{EF})^2 \right).$$

A.5 External Returns to Variety: General CES

Solving the benchmark model with the general CES aggregator with external returns introduced in text under flexible and fixed prices, respectively, delivers:

$$Y_t^{EF} = \left(\frac{1}{\theta f} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} (A_t \bar{L})^{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \frac{\theta-1}{\theta}$$

$$Y_t^{ES_p} = \frac{M_t}{\bar{p}} \left(\frac{A_t \bar{L}}{f} - \frac{M_t}{f \bar{p}} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}}.$$

Consider a steady state equilibrium with $\frac{M}{f \bar{p}} = \frac{\theta-1}{\theta f} A \bar{L} \rightarrow \frac{A \bar{L}}{f} - \frac{M}{f \bar{p}} = \frac{A \bar{L}}{\theta f}$

$$Y^{EF} = \left(\frac{1}{\theta f} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} (A \bar{L})^{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \frac{\theta-1}{\theta}$$

$$Y^{ES_p} = \frac{M}{\bar{p}} \left(\frac{A \bar{L}}{\theta f} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} = \frac{\theta-1}{\theta} A \bar{L} \left(\frac{A \bar{L}}{\theta f} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} = Y^{EF}$$

Taking a Taylor approximation around $Y^{EF} = \left(\frac{1}{\theta f} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} (A \bar{L})^{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \frac{\theta-1}{\theta}$

$$Y_t^{EF} - Y^{EF} = \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \right) \frac{\theta-1}{\theta} \left(\frac{1}{\theta f} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} (A \bar{L})^{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \left(\frac{A_t - A}{A} \right)$$

$$+ \frac{1}{2} \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \right) \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \right) \frac{\theta-1}{\theta} \left(\frac{1}{\theta f} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} (A \bar{L})^{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \left(\frac{A_t - A}{A} \right)^2 \rightarrow$$

$$\frac{Y_t^{EF} - Y^{EF}}{Y^{EF}} = \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \right) \left(\frac{A_t - A}{A} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \right) \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \right) \left(\frac{A_t - A}{A} \right)^2$$

$$Y_t^{ES_p} - Y^{EF} = \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \right) \frac{A \bar{L}}{f} \frac{M}{\bar{p}} \left(\frac{A \bar{L}}{f} - \frac{M}{f \bar{p}} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} - 1} \left(\frac{A_t - A}{A} \right)$$

$$+ \frac{1}{2} \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \right) \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} - 1 \right) \left(\frac{A \bar{L}}{f} \right)^2 \frac{M}{\bar{p}} \left(\frac{A \bar{L}}{f} - \frac{M}{f \bar{p}} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} - 2} \left(\frac{A_t - A}{A} \right)^2$$

Recall $Y = \frac{M}{\bar{p}} \left(\frac{AL}{f} - \frac{M_t}{f\bar{p}} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}}$ and $\frac{M}{f\bar{p}} = \frac{\theta-1}{\theta f} A\bar{L} \rightarrow \frac{AL}{f} - \frac{M}{f\bar{p}} = \frac{AL}{\theta f}$

$$\frac{Y_t^{ES_p} - Y^{EF}}{Y^{EF}} = \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \right) \theta \left(\frac{A_t - A}{A} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \right) \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} - 1 \right) \theta^2 \left(\frac{A_t - A}{A} \right)^2$$

The ES_p response is larger to first-order iff $\lambda > 0$, as discussed in text. Here, we focus on the second-order difference. The ES_p response is larger second-order iff $\lambda > \frac{\theta}{\theta+1}$. (But now even with *negative* externality there can be over-reaction to negative shocks driven by higher-order effects. If the shock is negative enough, the higher-order term eventually kicks in.)

In the figure, we plot the case $\lambda = 0.2$ for the two respective cases: blue solid for sticky prices, red dash for flexible prices. We use again the normalization with f that equalizes Y^{EF} to Y^{NF} , $\bar{L} \frac{\theta-1}{\theta} = (\theta f)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}}$. Then, we choose money supply M to equalize the SP equilibrium Y^{ES_p} with FE to this same $Y^{EF} = Y^{NF}$. This requires, using f :

$$Y = \bar{L} = \frac{M}{\bar{p}} \left(\bar{L} - \frac{M}{\bar{p}} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} \frac{\theta^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}}}{\bar{L}^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} (\theta - 1)} \rightarrow 1 = \frac{M}{\bar{p}\bar{L}} \left(1 - \frac{M}{\bar{L}\bar{p}} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} \frac{\theta^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}}}{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}},$$

again delivering $\frac{M}{\bar{p}} = \bar{L} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta} \right)$. Replacing these, we thus plot

$$Y_t^{EF} = A_t^{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \bar{L} \text{ and } Y_t^{ES_p} = \bar{L} (\theta A_t - (\theta - 1))^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}}.$$




Fig. A1: Y^{EF} (flex. prices) red dash, Y^{ES_p} (sticky prices) solid blue. External-returns $\lambda=0.2$

The response of the output gap to a negative shock can be found as follows to second order.

$$c_t^{EF} = \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right) a_t + \frac{1}{2} \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right) a_t^2$$

$$c_t^{ES_p} = \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) \theta a_t + \frac{1}{2} \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} - 1 \right) \theta^2 a_t^2$$

The effect of supply shocks is thus:

$$\frac{dc_t^{EF}}{da_t} = \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right) + \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right) da_t$$

$$\frac{dc_t^{ES_p}}{da_t} = \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) \theta + \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} - 1 \right) \theta^2 da_t$$

The effect on the output gap is

$$\frac{d(c_t^{ES_p} - c_t^{EF})}{da_t} = \lambda(\theta - 1) + \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) [\lambda(\theta^2 - 1) + \theta - \theta^2] da_t$$

This is larger than zero (so falls more to negative shocks) if:

$$\lambda(\theta - 1) + \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) [\lambda(\theta^2 - 1) + \theta - \theta^2] da_t > 0$$

Even with negative externalities $\lambda < 0$, this can still hold for negative enough shock, i.e.:

$$\left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) [\lambda(\theta^2 - 1) + \theta - \theta^2] da_t > -\lambda(\theta - 1) > 0,$$

we need

$$\lambda < \frac{\theta}{\theta + 1}$$

which is always satisfied when $\lambda < 0$ since the right side is positive.

So the condition is:

$$d(-a_t) > \frac{\lambda}{\left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) [\lambda(\theta + 1) - \theta]}.$$

For a calibration with the overall benefit of variety $(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1})$ equal to half the markup, $\lambda(\theta - 1) =$

−.5 (a property of the translog preferences used in Bilbiie et al 2012 to match the cyclicalities of markups and profits), the threshold is 0.215.

Insights from approximating $Y(N)$

Taking a second-order approximation of the aggregate production function/resource constraint:

$$Y_t = N_t^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} (A_t \bar{L} - N_t f)$$

around the steady-state of the FP equilibrium (same as for SP equilibrium) with $N^{EF} = \frac{A\bar{L}}{f\theta}$, $Y^{EF} = (N^{EF})^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} (A\bar{L} - N^{EF} f) = (N^{EF})^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} \frac{\theta-1}{\theta} A\bar{L}$

$$\begin{aligned} Y_t \simeq Y &+ \left(\left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \right) N^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} - 1} (A\bar{L} - Nf) - N^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} f \right) (N_t - N) \\ &+ \frac{1}{2} \left(\begin{array}{l} \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \right) \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} - 1 \right) N^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} - 2} (A\bar{L} - Nf) \\ - \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \right) N^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} - 1} f - \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \right) N^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} - 1} f \end{array} \right) (N_t - N)^2 \end{aligned}$$

and writing with percentage deviations:

$$\tilde{y}_t \simeq \lambda n_t + \frac{1}{2} \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \right) \left(\lambda - \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \right) n_t^2.$$

B Loglinearized general-CES NK model

This Appendix presents the loglinearized NK model with *arbitrary* benefit of input variety and first-order welfare effects, directly comparable with the plain-vanilla textbook version of the no-entry NK model.

In Table A1, we outline the key equilibrium responses of the loglinearized model, around a steady state with no supply shock mirroring the same structure as for Table 1, but for the loglinearized model. Letting a small letter denote the log-deviation from the respective steady-state, the

loglinearized Euler equation (9) and Taylor rule are, respectively:

$$c_t = E_t c_{t+1} - (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}^C); \text{ and} \quad (31)$$

$$i_t = \phi \pi_t. \quad (32)$$

B.1 No-Entry Loglinearized Model

In the *No-Entry* model (superscript N) in the first row, under price flexibility all real variables are determined independently of any nominal forces (neutrality): in our case, exclusively by the supply shock $y_t^{NF} = c_t^{NF} = a_t$.⁴¹ Given this optimal solution for consumption and output, the Euler equation serves to merely pin down the natural (Wicksellian), flexible-price interest rate: since we already solved for c_t^{NF} this implicitly defines the intertemporal price that confirms to agents that they are right to set that consumption path over time, $r_t^{NF} = E_t a_{t+1} - a_t$. Recalling that without entry $\pi_t = \pi_t^C$, the Taylor rule then determines uniquely the path of inflation through $\pi_t^{NF} = \phi^{-1} (E_t \pi_{t+1}^{NF} + r_t^{NF})$ iff the Taylor principle is satisfied—but this is of course of no consequence for the real allocation.

With sticky (*fixed*) prices, the aggregate demand side, Euler equation (9) with no entry ($\pi_t = \pi_t^C$) is $(C_t^N)^{-1} = \beta E_t \left[(1 + r_t^N) (C_{t+1}^N)^{-1} \right]$, where the real interest rate is $1 + r_t^N \equiv (1 + I_t^N) / (1 + \pi_{t+1}^N)$. This illustrates most clearly that with either fixed prices and a Taylor rule ($P_t = \bar{P}$, $\pi_{t+1}^N = 0$, I_t^N fixed) or with a fixed real rate r_t^N , aggregate activity is invariant to supply shocks: it is fully pinned down by (9), where supply shocks do not appear. What bears the adjustment instead is the real wage, and with it hours worked, markups, and profits.⁴²

In the upper right quadrant of Table A1 we outline the full equilibrium under *sticky* (fixed) prices. Hours worked increase proportionally with the negative supply shock $-a_t$ (as long as there is no rationing, which we implicitly assume); real wages increase, and markups and profits fall. Hours increase, even though the real wage goes up, because there is a negative income effect that dominates. This negative income effect arises because as wages go up, marginal cost goes up and profits go down—thus decreasing the income of households. This foreshadows the intuition

⁴¹Profits in the no-entry model are expressed as a share of steady-state Y : $d_t \equiv \frac{D_t - D}{Y} \simeq \frac{1}{\theta} y_t - mc_t$.

⁴²Note that $\frac{p_t}{P}$ is no longer the profit-maximizing price. The aggregate production function and resource constraint is still $C_t = A_t L_t$; this implicitly assumes that all markets clear, although prices are fixed. The adjustment necessary for equilibrium to obtain is borne by the nominal (and real) wage.

for our model with entry, in which such profits variations cannot occur in equilibrium because they entail entry and exit, with different aggregate implications.

The key summary statistic describing whether the model generates or not a "demand recession" following a bad supply shock is whether output under sticky prices falls by more than output under flexible prices—that is, whether the output gap responds negatively to negative supply shocks. As it should be clear by now, in the no-entry-exit NK model the answer is no, the output gap being:

$$\frac{\partial (y_t^{NS_p} - y_t^{NF})}{\partial (-a_t)} = 1,$$

and thus in fact *increasing* with bad supply shocks.

Table A1: Full loglinearized solution conditional on supply shock a_t		
	Flexible Prices F	Sticky Prices S
No-Entry (N)	$y_t^{NF} = c_t^{NF} = a_t$ $l_t^{NF} = 0$ $w_t^{NF} = a_t$ $\mu_t^{NF} = -mc_t^{NF} = 0$ $d_t^{NF} = \frac{1}{\theta} a_t$ $r_t^{NF} = E_t a_{t+1} - a_t$ $\pi_t^{NF} = \phi^{-1} (E_t \pi_{t+1}^{NF} + r_t^{NF})$	$y_t^{NS_p} = c_t^{NS_p} = 0$ $l_t^{NS_p} = -a_t$ $w_t^{NS_p} = -\varphi a_t$ $\mu_t^{NS_p} = -mc_t^{NS_p} = (1 + \varphi) a_t$ $d_t^{NS_p} = (1 + \varphi) a_t$ $r_t^{NS_p} = 0$ $\pi_t^{NS_p} = 0$
Entry-Exit (E)	$y_t^{EF} = c_t^{EF} = (\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}) a_t$ $n_t^{EF} = a_t$ $l_t^{EF} = 0$ $w_t^{EF} = (\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}) a_t$ $\mu_t^{EF} = -mc_t^{EF} = 0$ $d_t^{EF} = 0$ $r_t^{EF} = (\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}) (E_t a_{t+1} - a_t)$ $\pi_t^{EF} = \phi^{-1} (E_t \pi_{t+1}^{EF} + r_t^*)$ $(\pi_t^C)^{EF} = \pi_t^{EF} - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}) (a_t - a_{t-1})$	$y_t^{ES_p} = c_t^{ES_p} = (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}) \theta a_t$ $n_t^{ES_p} = \theta a_t$ $l_t^{ES_p} = 0$ $w_t^{ES_p} = (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}) \theta a_t$ $\mu_t^{ES_p} = -mc_t^{ES_p} = a_t$ $d_t^{ES_p} = 0$ $r_t^{ES_p} = (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}) \theta (E_t a_{t+1} - a_t)$ $\pi_t^{ES_p} = 0$ $(\pi_t^C)^{EF} = -(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}) \theta (a_t - a_{t-1})$

Labor-Market Intuition with No Entry: The supply disruption (a_t falls) shifts labor demand downwards. This triggers an income effect on labor supply as the wage falls, so labor supply shifts rightward. By virtue of the log-utility assumption, income and substitution effects cancel out and hours stay unchanged: the wage falls one-to-one, and markup and profits stay unchanged. There is inflation as firms increase prices to keep real marginal cost (markup) constant at the desired level; how much inflation there is depends on the Taylor rule response. If the shock is transitory, the natural interest rate goes up to give agents the right intertemporal incentives to consume less today.

With sticky prices, labor demand still moves down initially, as the marginal cost goes up; but now firms cannot increase prices, so the markup goes down, and profits go down too. Consumption and output do not change because there is no intertemporal substitution: with fixed prices (or with a fixed real rate) the Euler equation implies that consumption stays unchanged. In terms of labor market equilibrium, labor supply does not shift: we move *along* it. Markup and profits go down by enough to make it optimal to work more and keep consumption unchanged (income effect), while the real wage goes up by ϕa_t (substitution effect).

B.2 Endogenous Entry-Exit Loglinearized Model

Under endogenous entry-exit and flexible prices, the solution is readily obtained by noticing that $\mu_t^{EF} = \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}$. By virtue of logarithmic utility in consumption, hours worked stay constant (income and substitution effects on labor cancel out). Through (5), the real wage responds to labor productivity with elasticity $\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}$; the effect is amplified relative to the no-entry model by the standard variety effect that acts like a form of increasing returns, making output and consumption also move with the shock in the same manner. The number of firms changes proportionally to the shock: a decrease in productivity triggers exit because it induces losses. The lower left quadrant of Table A1 outlines the full solution of the EF (endogenous entry-exit, flexible-price) model. Other than substantiating the above, notice that the natural interest rate responds with the same sign as under no entry-exit but with a larger elasticity, driven by the increasing returns. Since the natural rate increases with bad shocks, there is inflation in producer prices. And since there is exit, there is even higher inflation in consumer prices through the benefit of input variety. These inflation

dynamics are nevertheless *still irrelevant* for the real allocation since prices are flexible.

Matters are different with sticky prices. Hours worked are again fixed in equilibrium, because income and substitution effects of the real wage cancel out (log utility in consumption), and in addition there are no extra income effects due to profits, which are zero by virtue of free entry. This can be seen by combining equations (7) and (6), and recalling the discussion after the latter, which implies that in loglinearized terms we have $w_t = c_t$.

Combining the loglinearized Euler equation (31) with the loglinearized (8) relating CPI, PPI inflation and variety growth:

$$\pi_t = \pi_t^C + \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) (n_t - n_{t-1}), \quad (33)$$

and imposing fixed producer prices $\pi_t = 0$, we obtain:

$$c_t = E_t c_{t+1} - \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) (E_t n_{t+1} - n_t). \quad (34)$$

Loglinearization of the markup-pricing rule (2) combined with the relative price (1) delivers:

$$w_t - a_t = \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) n_t - \mu_t, \quad (35)$$

while the free-entry condition (4) is:

$$n_t = a_t + l_t + (\theta - 1) \mu_t. \quad (36)$$

Combining the last two while imposing that hours are constant in this equilibrium $l_t = 0$ and replacing in $w_t = c_t$, we obtain:

$$c_t = \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} a_t + \lambda n_t$$

Together with the Euler equation under fixed prices (34), this delivers

$$n_t^{ES_p} = \theta a_t; \quad c_t^{ES_p} = \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) \theta a_t,$$

and the rest of the solution reported in the lower right quadrant of Table A1. Direct comparison

with the solution under flexible prices delivers our condition for (first-order) negative output gap following a negative supply shock, $\lambda > 0$.

To help intuition, consider again the *labor market equilibrium*. With free entry-exit and flexible prices (EF), there is a larger recession than with no entry (NF) because of the variety effect which generates aggregate returns to scale: aggregate LD is upward sloping (with slope $\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}$) and shifts by $\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}$ with supply disturbances. Individual labor demand is as before, but now an increase in marginal cost and fall in markup triggers *exit* (product destruction); since prices can be freely set, the amount of product destruction is dictated by the benefit of variety. This is represented with blue dashes in Figure 4.

Consider next sticky (fixed) prices ES. Since prices cannot increase now, the *markup goes down*. The crucial question is: does LD shift up, or down? This depends on the benefit of input variety $\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}$ versus the net markup $\frac{1}{\theta-1}$. When external returns are positive $\lambda > 0$, the benefit of input variety is higher and LD shifts further down: instead of a fall in profits, as under no entry), there is now exit. As a result, LS shifts further right due to the further negative income effect and, as we will see, consistent with intertemporal substitution. In other words, there is a *negative output gap*: consumption and income fall more than under flexible prices.

A complementary intuition starts from recalling that since prices cannot increase, the *markup goes down*. When the benefit of variety is higher than the markup, labor demand shifts further down: instead of a fall in profits (as under no entry-exit), there is now exit. The loglinear approximation of aggregate labor demand is:

$$w_t = \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \right) a_t + \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \right) l_t + \lambda (\theta - 1) \mu_t;$$

when the markup falls and real marginal cost increases there is a shift downwards in labor demand when $\lambda > 0$: demand forces dominate, labor demand plunges, and this demand shortage is met by dropping products. As a result, labor supply shifts further right due to the further negative income effect and, as we discuss in the dynamic model, consistent with intertemporal substitution.

Neutrality without external effects

The first-order irrelevance (of price stickiness) under CES, without external effects $\lambda = 0$, applies for arbitrary price stickiness and can be seen most clearly by inspecting the loglinearized markup rule (the combination of (1) and (2)) and the free entry condition (4), respectively:⁴³

$$\begin{aligned} w_t - a_t &= \frac{1}{\theta - 1} n_t - \mu_t; \\ n_t &= a_t + l_t + (\theta - 1) \mu_t. \end{aligned}$$

Combining the two delivers a loglinearized version of the aggregate labor demand (5):

$$w_t = \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} a_t + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} l_t. \quad (37)$$

This illustrates that, as stated in text in the discussion of equation (13), to a first-order approximation, any endogenous changes in markups and in the extensive margin perfectly offset each other when it comes to the aggregate labor-demand effects of productivity shocks (they drop out from the aggregate labor demand equation, 37). (In contrast, in the fixed-entry model, productivity changes engender endogenous changes in markups that shift the aggregate labor demand.)

Aggregate Demand and Variety: Intertemporal Interpretation

A key element of the model is the aggregate Euler equation governing aggregate demand (31), which written in gaps from the flexible-price equilibrium is:

$$c_t^{ES_p} - c_t^{EF} = E_t c_{t+1}^{ES_p} - E_t c_{t+1}^{EF} - \left(i_t - E_t \left(\pi_{t+1}^C \right)^{ES_p} - r_t^{EF} \right)$$

where $r_t^{EF} = \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right) (E_t a_{t+1} - a_t)$ is the natural interest rate. In this Euler equation, the relevant real rate is defined relative to CPI inflation. Spelling out CPI inflation using (33) we have:

$$c_t^{ES_p} - c_t^{EF} = E_t c_{t+1}^{ES_p} - E_t c_{t+1}^{EF} - \left[i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}^{ES_p} + \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) \left(E_t n_{t+1}^{ES_p} - n_t^{ES_p} \right) - r_t^{EF} \right], \quad (38)$$

⁴³These are equations 7 and 8 in Table A2, which outlines the full set of equilibrium conditions, nonlinear and loglinearized, for the most general version of the model which nests this as a special case.

which generalizes the aggregate-Euler IS curve with entry derived in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007, equation 12).

With entry-exit, even when producer prices are fixed (or the real rate defined with respect to PPI inflation $i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}^{ES_p}$ is fixed), the output gap is no longer proportional to the natural interest rate, as in a no-entry model. Indeed, the output gap then falls with bad supply shocks $\frac{\partial(c_t^{ES_p} - c_t^{EF})}{\partial(-a_t)} < 0$ if:

$$\left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1}\right) \frac{\partial(E_t n_{t+1}^{ES_p} - n_t^{ES_p})}{\partial(-a_t)} > \frac{\partial r_t^{EF}}{\partial(-a_t)},$$

that is if the increase in "expected inflation" that is purely due to the variety effect exceeds the increase in the natural rate. Replacing the responses of $n_t^{ES_p}$ and r_t^{EF} we recover $\lambda > 0$.

Thus, with $i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}^{ES_p}$ fixed, the real rate that is relevant for aggregate demand—i.e. real relative to CPI inflation—goes up since there is exit today, thus triggering intertemporal substitution towards the future. The labor supply then shifts right because of intertemporal substitution. This is a general mechanism that translates to our setup where producer prices are arbitrarily sticky, not fixed, outlined next.

The AD representation (38) also suggests a possible way out of a supply-driven, exit-amplified crisis: subsidize entry or sales temporarily so as to break the exit loop and generate future expected CPI inflation, and a boost in aggregate demand today by intertemporal substitution. This policy works even when interest rates are constrained against the lower bound.

B.3 The 3-Equation NK model with Free Entry-Exit

Like the textbook NK model (Woodford 2003, Gali 2008) our model can be summarized by an Aggregate Demand (IS curve) and Aggregate Supply (Phillips curve), with arbitrary degree of price stickiness. The former is given by (38), where we replace the number of firms using aggregate accounting $c_t = \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} a_t + \lambda n_t$ to obtain, after substitutions and using the flex-price equilibrium $c_t^{EF} = (\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}) a_t$ and $r_t^{EF} = E_t c_{t+1}^{EF} - c_t^{EF} = (\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}) (E_t a_{t+1} - a_t)$:

$$c_t - c_t^{EF} = E_t (c_{t+1} - c_{t+1}^{EF}) + \lambda (\theta - 1) \left(i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} r_t^{EF} \right) \quad (39)$$

or in levels (instead of gaps):

$$c_t = E_t c_{t+1} - \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) \theta (E_t a_{t+1} - a_t) + \lambda (\theta - 1) (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}) \quad (40)$$

We derive Aggregate Supply starting from the Phillips curve for PPI inflation obtained by assuming that it is costly for individual producers to change their prices, as in Bilbiie, Gironi and Melitz (2007):

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} - \psi \mu_t, \quad (41)$$

where $\psi = (\theta - 1) / \kappa$ and κ is the Rotemberg adjustment-cost coefficient ranging from 0 (flexible prices) to infinity (fixed prices). The loglinearized free entry condition, using that hours worked are fixed in equilibrium, implies that $\mu_t = (\theta - 1)^{-1} (n_t - a_t)$ and using aggregate accounting $c_t = \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} a_t + \lambda n_t$ to replace the number of goods we obtain:

$$\mu_t = \frac{1}{\lambda (\theta - 1)} \left[c_t - \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right) a_t \right].$$

Replacing in the pricing equation and using $c_t^{EF} = \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right) a_t$ we obtain:

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} - \psi \frac{1}{\lambda (\theta - 1)} \left(c_t - c_t^{EF} \right) \quad (42)$$

Equations (39) and (42), together with a standard Taylor rule

$$i_t = \phi \pi_t - \varepsilon_t, \quad (43)$$

constitute a full description of the model.

Notice that when prices are flexible, the equilibrium is fully determined by the supply side AS (42), $c_t = c_t^{EF}$. While when prices are completely rigid, it is determined exclusively by the demand side, AD (39) or (40) $c_t^{ES_p} = \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) \theta a_t$. In between these two extremes, we need to solve the model.

To do so, we first notice that the requirement for equilibrium determinacy in the model with entry-exit is exactly the same as in the no-entry model: the Taylor principle $\phi > 1$. To prove this,

replace (42) and (43) into (39) to eliminate the output gap and interest rate, obtaining (let):

$$\pi_t - \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} = E_t \pi_{t+1} - \beta E_t \pi_{t+2} - \psi \left(\phi \pi_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} r_t^{EF} \right), \quad (44)$$

Solving under AR1 shock with persistence ρ_a , $E_t a_{t+1} = \rho_a a_t$ and letting $\tilde{\psi} \equiv \psi / (1 - \beta \rho_a)$, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_t &= -\tilde{\psi} \frac{1 - \rho_a}{1 - \rho_a + (\phi - \rho_a) \tilde{\psi}} a_t \\ c_t - c_t^{EF} &= \lambda (\theta - 1) \frac{1 - \rho_a}{1 - \rho_a + (\phi - \rho_a) \tilde{\psi}} a_t \end{aligned}$$

The result generalizes the previous one, derived with fixed prices: when the condition making demand, variety forces dominate supply, entry-exit forces holds ($\lambda > 0$), a bad supply shock causes a *negative output gap* and *PPI inflation*. Whereas in the opposite case, it causes a *positive output gap* that is still accompanied by PPI inflation. As a side note, this points to the possibility of deriving an implicit empirical test, based on macro comovements, of the mysterious micro parameter λ . Since there is exit regardless of whether $\lambda \gtrless 0$, CPI inflation is also going up.

An important point, which is related to determinacy results staying unchanged relative to the no-entry model, is that the crossing of the threshold $\lambda = 0$ triggers a swiveling of *both* AD and AS: in the $\lambda > 0$ region, AD slopes upwards and AS slopes downwards. A shift upwards of AD (as happens when the natural interest rate goes up, in response to an adverse supply shock) moves us leftward along the downward sloping AS, thus triggering a fall in output gap and inflation. Whereas for $\lambda < 0$ AS and AD have regular slopes and a shock shifting AD up causes an increase in the output gap and inflation, moving along an upward sloping AS curve.⁴⁴

B.4 No-entry NK model recap

It is important to understand that the effects we emphasize are altogether absent in the standard, no-entry, fixed-variety NK model. A recapitulation of that model's core equations illustrates that point. Recalling that we use as a benchmark a logarithmic utility function in consumption, the IS

⁴⁴In the CES-DS case, AD is vertical and price stickiness is irrelevant, the neutrality result in Bilbiie (2019).

curve is:

$$\begin{aligned} c_t^N &= E_t c_{t+1}^N - \left(i_t^N - E_t \pi_{t+1}^N \right), \text{ or in gaps} \\ c_t^N - c_t^{NF} &= E_t \left(c_{t+1}^N - c_{t+1}^{NF} \right) - \left(i_t^N - E_t \pi_{t+1}^N - r_t^{NF} \right) \end{aligned} \quad (45)$$

while the Phillips curve is $\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} - \psi \mu_t$ or, replacing the markup:

$$\pi_t^N = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1}^N + \psi (1 + \varphi) (c_t^N - a_t)$$

If we now allow for inflation to move in response to adverse supply shocks, it will increase and, through the active Taylor rule, trigger an increase in real interest rates and a fall in consumption. The output gap, however, is still always positive (in a determinate equilibrium). Take shock with persistence ρ_a and using the same notation for $\tilde{\psi} \equiv \psi / (1 - \beta \rho_a)$

$$\frac{dr_t^{NF}}{d(-a_t)} = 1 - \rho_a$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d(c_t^N - c_t^{NF})}{d(-a_t)} &= (1 - \rho_a + (\phi - \rho_a) \tilde{\psi} (1 + \varphi))^{-1} \frac{dr_t^{NF}}{d(-a_t)} \\ &= \frac{1 - \rho_a}{1 - \rho_a + (\phi - \rho_a) \tilde{\psi} (1 + \varphi)} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

with the limit $dc_t^N = dc_t^{NF}$ reached when shocks are permanent, prices flexible (trivially), or labor inelastic. The response of the consumption (output) level is:

$$\frac{dc_t^N}{d(-a_t)} = - \frac{(\phi - \rho_a) \tilde{\psi} (1 + \varphi)}{1 - \rho_a + (\phi - \rho_a) \tilde{\psi} (1 + \varphi)}$$

C Extensions: Alternative Utility Functional Forms

We extend our results to CRRA utility of C ; GHH utility without income effects on labor; and a general homothetic input aggregator instead of CES.

C.1 CRRA utility of C: Income effects and intertemporal substitution

Assume that utility takes the CRRA form, allowing for arbitrary income effects on labor supply and intertemporal substitution, both parameterized by the curvature σ^{-1}

$$U(C, L) = \frac{C^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}} - 1}{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}} - \chi \frac{L^{1+\varphi}}{1 + \varphi}$$

This changes (only) the labor supply and the Euler equation for aggregate consumption in a standard way, i.e.:

$$\chi L_t^\varphi = C_t^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} W_t; \quad (46)$$

$$C_t^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \beta E_t \left(\frac{1 + I_t}{1 + \pi_{t+1}^C} C_{t+1}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \right). \quad (47)$$

To find the condition for **Edgeworth complementarity**, take the cross-derivative of utility with respect to demand of two goods ω and $\tilde{\omega}$; direct differentiation of the CRRA function having replaced the CES aggregate $\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left[\left(\int_0^{N_t} c_t(\omega)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} d\omega \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1} (1-\frac{1}{\sigma})} - 1 \right]$ delivers:

$$U_{c_\omega c_{\tilde{\omega}}} = \left(\frac{1}{\theta} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right) c_{\omega t}^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} c_{\tilde{\omega} t}^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} c_t^{\frac{2}{\theta} - \frac{1}{\sigma} - 1},$$

implying immediately that goods are Edgeworth complements $U_{c_\omega c_{\tilde{\omega}}} > 0$ when $\sigma > \theta$.

Solving the model under this utility function delivers, for flexible prices:

$$n_t^{EF} = \frac{1}{1 - \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \right) \frac{1-\sigma^{-1}}{1+\varphi}} \hat{a}_t$$

$$y_t^{EF} = c_t^{EF} = \frac{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}{1 - \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \right) \frac{1-\sigma^{-1}}{1+\varphi}} \hat{a}_t$$

and for fixed sticky prices SP:

$$n_t^{ES_p} = \frac{\theta}{\sigma} \frac{1}{1 - (1 - \sigma^{-1}) \left[\frac{(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})\theta}{1+\varphi} - \lambda(\theta-1) \right]} \hat{a}_t$$

$$y_t^{ES_p} = c_t^{ES_p} = \frac{(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})\theta}{1 - (1 - \sigma^{-1}) \left[\frac{(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})\theta}{1+\varphi} - \lambda(\theta-1) \right]} \hat{a}_t$$

The first observation is that the "entry multiplier" (ratio of ES and EF responses of n_t) is now:

$$\frac{\theta}{\sigma} \frac{1 - (\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}) \frac{1-\sigma^{-1}}{1+\varphi}}{1 - (1 - \sigma^{-1}) \left[(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}) \frac{\theta}{1+\varphi} - \lambda(\theta-1) \right]}$$

When is there amplification of the entry response? Under log utility, we recover $\theta > 1$; under inelastic labor, the solution in text θ/σ with the multiplier requirement $\theta > \sigma$. Under CES, likewise θ/σ . The interaction of non-log utility, elastic labor, and external effects generates richer dynamics. In particular, the responses of entry in both FP and SP can even change sign (positive to negative shock) when:

$$EF : \frac{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} - \varphi}{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} > \sigma^{-1}$$

$$ES_p : 1 < (1 - \sigma^{-1}) \left[\frac{(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})\theta}{1+\varphi} - \lambda(\theta-1) \right]$$

For CES, the condition is the same for EF and ES:

$$\theta < \sigma(1 - (\theta-1)\varphi)$$

Thus, under this condition—which under infinitely elastic labor $\varphi = 0$ in fact coincides with the amplification condition in Guerrieri et al—the endogenous response of entry to supply shocks flips sign under both flexible and sticky prices.

The response of the output gap to a supply disruption in the free entry-exit model is thus:

$$\frac{\partial (y_t^{ES_p} - y_t^{EF})}{\partial (-a_t)} = -\lambda(\theta-1) \frac{[1 + (\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1})(\sigma^{-1} - 1)]}{\Omega}$$

where $\Omega \equiv \left(1 - (1 - \sigma^{-1}) \left[\frac{(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})^\theta}{1+\varphi} - \lambda(\theta-1) \right] \right) \left(1 - (\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}) \frac{1-\sigma^{-1}}{1+\varphi} \right) > 0$ by the restriction that $y_t^{ES_p}$ and y_t^{EF} both individually still fall with supply shocks. The question is, as before, when does the former fall by more than the latter?

Proposition 4 *Supply-driven demand recessions $\frac{\partial(y_t^{ES_p} - y_t^{EF})}{\partial(-a_t)} < 0$ can occur in two cases:*

1. *If $\lambda > 0$, when $\sigma < 1 + (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})^{-1} < \theta$*
2. *If $\lambda < 0$, when $\sigma > 1 + (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})^{-1} > \theta$*

Case 1 is a generalization of our Proposition (3), in particular the condition for first-order effects $\lambda > 0$, to the case with larger income effect. Case 2 is different, and the parameter condition is the equivalent of Guerrieri et al in our different model. Thus, in this case there is a dampening of the entry-exit response under ES, and a magnification of the intensive-margin response. This translates into amplification of the aggregate response when the benefit of variety is smaller than the markup, the reason mirroring our benchmark case: entry is now inefficiently *high* and too elastic, so anything that reduces its response to supply shocks generates a welfare improvement; sticky prices, in this case, play precisely that dampening role.

As entry-exit becomes inefficiently low and too little responsive in the market equilibrium, i.e. $\lambda > 0$ —a mechanism such as sticky prices that raises its responsiveness when $1 + (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})^{-1} > \sigma$ then generates a first-order effect on consumption too, while engendering an increase in the intensive margin of surviving goods, as goods are substitutes. Conversely, with too high entry-exit $\lambda < 0$, we need the entry response to be dampened and the intensive margin to contract (by complementarity) in order to obtain a demand contraction.

Finally, we can solve for the responses of hours worked as, for flexible and sticky prices respectively:

$$l_t^{EF} = \frac{(1 - \sigma^{-1}) (\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1})}{1 + \varphi - (1 - \sigma^{-1}) (\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1})} \hat{a}_t$$

$$l_t^{ES_p} = \frac{(1 - \sigma^{-1}) (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}) \theta}{1 + \varphi - (1 - \sigma^{-1}) [(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}) \theta - \lambda(\theta-1)(1+\varphi)]} \hat{a}_t$$

Without external effects ($\lambda = 0$) this becomes:

$$l_t^{EF} = l_t^{ES_p} = (1 - \sigma^{-1}) \frac{\theta}{\theta(\varphi + \sigma^{-1}) - (1 + \varphi)} \hat{a}_t.$$

C.2 Aggregate-demand amplification with CRRA

We can derive analytically an extension of Proposition 2 for CRRA utility, in the simpler case of no externality and inelastic labor.

Proposition 5 *To second order, output under flexible and sticky prices is, respectively:*

$$\begin{aligned} y_t^{ES_p} &\simeq \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} a_t + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\theta^2 (1 + \sigma - \theta)}{\sigma (\theta - 1)^2} a_t^2, \\ y_t^{EF} &\simeq \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} a_t + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\theta}{(\theta - 1)^2} a_t^2. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the output gap is:

$$y_t^{ES_p} - y_t^{EF} \simeq -\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{\theta}{\sigma} - 1 \right) \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} a_t^2.$$

A demand recession in response to negative supply shocks occurs again when output is more concave under sticky prices, that is if (15) holds ($\theta > 1$ is again a restriction)—the same condition required for the entry-exit multiplier. The intuition is as discussed previously: via the entry-exit multiplier (when $\theta > \sigma$), adjustment happens disproportionately at the extensive margin and translates into aggregate-demand amplification, even though the first-order responses are still identical in the CES benchmark, through the concavity of output in the number of goods.

C.3 Complementarity or substitutability

To illustrate the difference with Guerrieri et al's benchmark model more sharply, we perform an analysis similar to theirs but in our different framework. Namely, consider the good-specific Euler equation, linking the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in one good and the "real" interest rate (with respect to inflation in the price of that good). In log-deviations from steady state, with $c_{\omega t}$ the log deviation of *individual* consumption of good ω a measure of the intensive margin, this is:

$$\frac{1}{\theta} c_{\omega t} + \left(\frac{1}{\sigma} - \frac{1}{\theta} \right) c_t = \frac{1}{\theta} E_t c_{\omega t+1} + \left(\frac{1}{\sigma} - \frac{1}{\theta} \right) E_t c_{t+1} - (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}). \quad (48)$$

The aggregation of individual into total consumption is: $c_t = c_{\omega t} + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}n_t$,⁴⁵ replacing this above, we obtain an Euler equation for the *intensive* margin for an *exogenously given* extensive margin:

$$c_{\omega t} = E_t c_{\omega t+1} - \left(1 - \frac{\sigma}{\theta}\right) \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} (n_t - E_t n_{t+1}) - \sigma (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}). \quad (49)$$

An exogenous fall in the number of varieties $dn_t < 0$ (at fixed PPI-real interest rate $i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}$) induces a fall in the demand for continuing goods if $\sigma > \theta$: this is exactly the condition in Guerrieri et al, the opposite of our requirement (15).⁴⁶ The intuition is that when $\sigma > \theta$, from the viewpoint of aggregate utility, any two individual goods are *Edgeworth complements*: a fall in the demand for one, or a fall in the number of goods, can only trigger a fall in the demand of surviving goods at constant real interest rates (and thus constant marginal utility of *those goods*) if the cross-derivative of utility with respect to any two goods is positive, i.e. complementarity. As it can be easily seen by direct differentiation of the CRRA function of the CES aggregator with respect to any two individual goods, the cross-derivative is proportional to $(\frac{1}{\theta} - \frac{1}{\sigma})$ and thus positive when $\sigma > \theta$, a condition that seems plausible at the aggregated, sectoral level. Our amplification condition instead pertains to the *disaggregated* level and requires individual goods to be Edgeworth substitutes.

Furthermore, the above characterizes a *partial-equilibrium* response, whereas our focus is on the *general-equilibrium, endogenous* entry-exit response. Consider thus instead the same Euler equation rewritten in terms of aggregate consumption (having replaced the expression for CPI inflation):

$$c_t = E_t c_{t+1} + \frac{\sigma}{\theta-1} (n_t - E_t n_{t+1}) - \sigma (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}). \quad (50)$$

For aggregate activity to go down more than under flexible prices, the number of firms needs fall enough—since exit increases the aggregate-demand relevant real (with respect to CPI inflation) interest rate and triggers intertemporal substitution towards future consumption. Endoge-

⁴⁵This is the loglinear version of $C_t = \rho_t N_t c_{\omega t}$.

⁴⁶An alternative illustration uses the solution under flexible prices to obtain the natural real (with respect to inflation in the individual good) interest rate $r_{\omega t}^{EF} \equiv (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1})^{EF}$:

$$r_{\omega t}^{EF} = \left(\frac{\theta}{\sigma} - 1\right) \frac{1}{\theta-1} (E_t a_{t+1} - a_t).$$

This "natural" interest rate can fall with bad supply shocks when, again, $\sigma > \theta$.

nous changes in the extensive margin are thus key determinants of the aggregate response.

Under our benchmark of CES preferences, however, the equilibrium responses of consumption under flexible and sticky prices coincide *to a first order* as illustrated in Proposition (5). In this reference case, intensive and extensive margins move in exactly compensating ways: when goods are complements $\sigma > \theta$, the intensive margin still falls with negative supply shocks, following the logic described above. But the response of entry-exit itself is scaled down by $\theta/\sigma < 1$, which exactly compensates the former. When the opposite condition holds, $\theta/\sigma > 1$, the extensive margin response is magnified, but the intensive margin moves, again, in a compensating way.⁴⁷ Taking a first-order approximation of consumption given the number of products we have under sticky prices $c_t^{ES_p} = \frac{\sigma}{\theta-1} n_t^{ES_p}$, while under flexible prices $c_t^{EF} = \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} n_t^{EF}$. The sticky-price response of entry-exit to the shock is scaled by θ/σ , but here we see that the (partial-equilibrium) response of consumption to entry-exit is scaled by the inverse σ/θ , neutralizing the former.⁴⁸ As we saw above, deviating from CES preferences opens up an output gap to first order, by mechanisms similar to the ones emphasized in our benchmark case.

Lastly, when our condition (15) fails and $\sigma > \theta$, the entry-exit dampening generates aggregate-demand dampening too through second-order terms, as clear from Proposition (5): the output gap response to supply disruptions is in fact positive, just like in the no-entry NK model.

C.4 GHH Utility: no income effects on labor

To analyze the response of hours worked, we solve all our models with GHH utility function:

$$U = \frac{1}{1-\nu} \left(C - \frac{L^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta} \right)^{1-\nu} \quad \text{and} \quad = \ln \left(C - \frac{L^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta} \right) \quad \text{if } \nu = 1$$

The key property of this is that it eliminates income effects on labor altogether, because the optimality condition for labor choice (the labor supply) is simply:

$$W = L^\eta,$$

⁴⁷The intuition for the exact compensation is the envelope argument stemming from the efficiency of entry with CES preferences.

⁴⁸With elastic labor, the aggregate-demand amplification properties now depend in subtler ways on the balance of these parameters and labor elasticity; in particular, the economy may even exhibit perverse effects whereby consumption in both EF and ES goes up with negative shocks, but the output gap goes *down*, making it inappropriate as a sufficient statistic.

which does not shift when income changes—we always move along it. The equilibrium is dictated by shifts in labor demand. The full solution is outlined in Table A2.

Table A2: Full loglinearized solution conditional on supply shock a_t		
	Flexible Prices F	Sticky Prices S_p
No-Entry (N)	$y_t^{NF} = c_t^{NF} = \frac{1+\eta}{\eta} a_t$ $l_t^{NF} = \frac{1}{\eta} a_t$ $w_t^{NF} = a_t$ $\mu_t^{NF} = -mc_t^{NF} = 0$ $d_t^{NF} = \frac{1}{\theta} \frac{1+\eta}{\eta} a_t$ $r_t^{NF} = E_t a_{t+1} - a_t$ $\pi_t^{NF} = \phi^{-1} (E_t \pi_{t+1}^{NF} + r_t^{NF})$	$y_t^{NS_p} = c_t^{NS_p} = -(\theta - 1) a_t$ $l_t^{NS_p} = -\theta a_t$ $w_t^{NS_p} = -\eta \theta a_t$ $\mu_t^{NS_p} = -mc_t^{NS_p} = (1 + \eta \theta) a_t$ $d_t^{NS_p} = (\frac{1}{\theta} + \eta \theta) a_t$ $r_t^{NS_p} = 0$ $\pi_t^{NS_p} = 0$
Entry-Exit (E)	$y_t^{EF} = c_t^{EF} = \frac{(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})(1+\eta)}{\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})} a_t$ $n_t^{EF} = \frac{1+\eta}{\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})} a_t$ $l_t^{EF} = \frac{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}{\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})} \hat{a}_t$ $w_t^{EF} = \eta \frac{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}{\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})} a_t$ $\mu_t^{EF} = -mc_t^{EF} = 0$ $d_t^{EF} = 0$ $r_t^{EF} = \frac{(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})(1+\eta)}{\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})} (E_t a_{t+1} - a_t)$ $\pi_t^{EF} = \phi^{-1} (E_t \pi_{t+1}^{EF} + r_t^*)$ $(\pi_t^C)^{EF} = \pi_t^{EF} - \frac{(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})(1+\eta)}{\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})} (a_t - a_{t-1})$	$y_t^{ES_p} = c_t^{ES_p} = \theta \frac{(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})(1+\eta)}{1+\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})\theta} a_t$ $n_t^{ES_p} = \theta \frac{1+\eta}{1+\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})\theta} a_t$ $l_t^{ES_p} = \theta \frac{\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}{1+\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})\theta} \hat{a}_t$ $w_t^{ES_p} = \theta \eta \frac{(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})}{1+\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})\theta} \hat{a}_t$ $\mu_t^{ES_p} = -mc_t^{ES_p} = \frac{1+\eta}{1+\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})\theta} a_t$ $d_t^{ES_p} = 0$ $r_t^{ES_p} = \theta \frac{(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})(1+\eta)}{1+\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})\theta} (E_t a_{t+1} - a_t)$ $\pi_t^{ES_p} = 0$ $(\pi_t^C)^{ES_p} = -\theta \frac{(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})(1+\eta)}{1+\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})\theta} (a_t - a_{t-1})$

The output gap response is

$$\frac{\partial (y_t^{ES_p} - y_t^{EF})}{\partial (-a_t)} = - \left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \right) \theta \frac{1+\eta}{1+\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})\theta} + \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \right) \frac{1+\eta}{\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})}$$

and it is negative whenever

$$\left(\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1} \right) \theta \frac{1+\eta}{1+\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})\theta} > \left(\lambda + \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \right) \frac{1+\eta}{\eta - (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1})}$$

Restricting attention to equilibria with standard responses (expansionary productivity improvements in both equilibria) we obtain the same condition as before:

$$\lambda > 0.$$

Even in the case without externalities $\lambda = 0$, the response of hours worked is still of interest. In the no-entry-exit model, it is $l_t^{NF} = \eta^{-1} a_t$ with flexible prices (η is the inverse labor elasticity), whereas it has the opposite sign $l_t^{NS_p} = -\theta a_t$ with sticky prices—reiterating the dichotomy we previously highlighted. With entry-exit, the responses are instead:

$$l_t^{EF} = l_t^{ES_p} = \frac{\theta}{\eta(\theta - 1) - 1} a_t. \quad (51)$$

This clearly illustrates that in both cases, hours are procyclical: $\eta(\theta - 1) > 1$ is the restriction for productivity improvements to be expansionary.

C.5 General Homothetic Input Aggregator

Assuming that the aggregator of intermediate goods takes the general homothetic form outlined in detail—in the context of preferences over individual varieties—in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012, 2019), the model changes as follows. The relative price capturing the benefit of input variety is now an arbitrary function $\rho(N_t)$ and so is the elasticity of substitution between goods—and thus the markup. The pricing condition becomes

$$\mu(N_t) \frac{w_t}{A_t} = \rho(N_t)$$

Loglinearization of the markup rule delivers:

$$w_t - a_t = \epsilon n_t - \mu_t,$$

where the elasticity of the relative price to the number of goods capture the benefit of input variety and we denote it by $\epsilon \equiv \rho_N N / \rho$.

The free entry condition is (with μ the steady-state markup).

$$n_t = a_t + l_t + \frac{1}{\mu - 1} \mu_t.$$

Finally, letting ζ be the markup elasticity to N we have, under **flexible prices**:

$$\mu_t = \zeta n_t.$$

The other equations remain unchanged. Because of log utility in consumption, hours worked are fixed and solving the above we obtain:

$$n_t^{EF} = \frac{1}{1 - \frac{\zeta}{\mu - 1}} a_t$$

Intuitively, countercyclical markups $\zeta < 0$ imply less entry in response to a supply shock.

Substituting in the economy resource constraint we obtain

$$c_t^{EF} = \frac{(\mu - 1)(1 + \epsilon) - \zeta \mu}{\mu - 1 - \zeta} a_t$$

Under fixed prices, we have instead from the Euler equation with fixed real (relative to PPI) rate $c_t - \epsilon n_t = 0$ and replacing in the aggregate resource constraint $c_t = \mu a_t + [\epsilon - (\mu - 1)] n_t$:

$$n_t^{ES_p} = \frac{\mu}{\mu - 1} a_t \text{ and } c_t^{ES_p} = \epsilon \frac{\mu}{\mu - 1} a_t$$

This illustrates clearly that the "entry-exit multiplier" survives as long as $\frac{\mu}{\mu - 1} > \frac{1}{1 - \frac{\zeta}{\mu - 1}}$, which is always true when desired markups are countercyclical $\zeta < 0$ and generically true for $\zeta < \frac{\mu - 1}{\mu}$.

Note that we still have identical EF and ES elasticities in the knife-edge case $\epsilon = \mu - 1$, $c_t^{ES_p} = c_t^{EF} = \mu a_t$.

AD amplification instead occurs when:

$$\epsilon \frac{\mu}{\mu - 1} > \frac{(\mu - 1)(1 + \epsilon) - \zeta \mu}{\mu - 1 - \zeta},$$

which (with countercyclical desired markups $\zeta < 0$ or $\zeta < \mu - 1$) implies:

$$\left(\frac{\epsilon}{\mu - 1} - 1 \right) (\mu - 1 - \zeta\mu) > 0 :$$

This yields the equivalent of our previous ($\lambda > 0$) condition:

$$\epsilon > \mu - 1.$$

The same condition also holds for procyclical desired markups $\zeta > \mu - 1 > 0$ since the requirement becomes:

$$\left(\zeta \frac{\mu}{\mu - 1} - 1 \right) (\epsilon - (\mu - 1)) > 0,$$

which also holds for $\epsilon > \mu - 1$. Therefore, our amplification condition applies to the wide class of general (non-CES) homothetic input aggregators.

D Complete general model outline

In this Appendix, we provide the full set of equations of the model with both sticky prices and wages in the general case. The "wage stickiness" part is completely standard—the wage-setting decision is made by an union bundling the differentiated labor inputs of household, setting the nominal wage subject to adjustment frictions—and its details are unaffected by the introduction of entry on the firm side. For the sake of space, we do not report all derivations of this block but refer the reader to Erceg et al (2000) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006).

D.1 Nonlinear model

We first provide the nonlinear equations (used to calculate the impulse-response functions in Figure 2 and the numbers in the special cases and other calibrations discussed therein). Note that the total GDP of the economy, inclusive of the adjustment cost, is $X_t = (1 - \frac{\kappa}{2} \pi_t^2)^{-1} C_t$ and we used this in rewriting the Phillips curve. We also replaced that the relative price is equal to the benefit of variety $\rho_t = N_t^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}}$ and that consumption is equal to output (net of the price adjustment cost) $C_t = Y_t$.

Table A3. Sticky-price Model Summary

1 Euler equation	$Y_t^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \beta E_t \left(\frac{1+i_t}{1+\pi_{t+1}^C} Y_{t+1}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \right)$
2 Labor supply	$\chi L_t^\varphi = w_t Y_t^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}$
3 CPI inflation	$\frac{1+\pi_t}{1+\pi_t^C} = \left(\frac{N_t}{N_{t-1}} \right)^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}}$
4 Aggregate accounting	$Y_t = w_t L_t$
5. Markup (Phillips curve)	$\mu_t \left(1 - \frac{\kappa}{2} \pi_t^2 \right) = \frac{\theta}{(\theta-1)+\kappa} \left\{ (1+\pi_t) \pi_t - \beta E_t \left[\left(\frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} \right)^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{N_t}{N_{t+1}} \frac{(1+\pi_{t+1}) \pi_{t+1}}{1-\frac{\kappa}{2} \pi_{t+1}^2} \right] \right\}$
6 Policy	$1 + i_t = \beta^{-1} (1 + \pi_t)^\phi \exp(-\varepsilon_t)$
7 Pricing	$N_t^{\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}} = \mu_t \frac{w_t}{A_t}$
8 Free Entry	$A_t L_t \left[1 - \frac{1}{\mu_t (1 - \frac{\kappa}{2} \pi_t^2)} \right] = f N_t$

In the sticky-wage case the disutility of labor can be written as $\frac{1}{1+\varphi} \left(\frac{L_t}{1 - \frac{\kappa_w}{2} \pi_{w,t}^2} \right)^{1+\varphi}$ where we already replaced labor supply using labor market clearing $L_t / (1 - \frac{\kappa_w}{2} \pi_{w,t}^2)$ where L_t is total labor demand and the denominator is related to the labor cost of adjusting nominal wages paid by the union.

Denote the wage inflation rate by:

$$1 + \pi_{w,t} = \frac{w_t}{w_{t-1}} (1 + \pi_t)$$

The optimality condition for each union setting wages for a differentiated labor type subject to a downward sloping labor demand with elasticity θ_w , Rotemberg adjustment costs paid in labor units κ_w and a labor subsidy s_w is:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\pi_{w,t} (\pi_{w,t} + 1)}{1 - \frac{\kappa_w}{2} \pi_{w,t}^2} &= \beta E_t \left[\left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{L_{t+1}}{L_t} \frac{\pi_{w,t+1} (\pi_{w,t+1} + 1)^2}{1 - \frac{\kappa_w}{2} \pi_{w,t+1}^2} \right] \\ &+ \frac{\theta_w - 1}{\kappa_w} \left[\frac{\theta_w}{\theta_w - 1} \frac{1}{w_t C_t^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}} \left(\frac{L_t}{1 - \frac{\kappa_w}{2} \pi_{w,t}^2} \right)^\varphi - (1 + s_w) \right]. \end{aligned}$$

The full model is described by the equations in Table A3, where equation 5 (labor supply) is replaced by the wage Phillips curve, and adding the wage inflation definition. In the simulations, we set $\theta_w = \theta$, $\kappa_w = \kappa$, and an optimal subsidy eliminating the steady-state labor market inefficiency $s_w = (\theta_w - 1)^{-1}$ (the goods market is already efficient by virtue of free entry).

Analytical solution under fixed prices and wages

The model can be solved analytically in this special case, whereby we assume that, as in Appendix A.1 above, that the central bank controls the marginal utility of nominal income $\Omega \equiv Y_t^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} N_t^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} = Y_{t+1}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} N_{t+1}^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}$. (with log utility, this is just the inverse of the money supply). Imposing this in the model of Table A3 and solving delivers, using $Y_t = \Omega^{-\sigma} N_t^{\frac{\sigma}{\theta-1}}$

$$\begin{aligned} N_t^{ES_{pw}} &= \left[\frac{1}{f \frac{\bar{W}}{\bar{p}} \Omega^\sigma} \left(A_t - \frac{\bar{W}}{\bar{p}} \right) \right]^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta-\sigma}} \\ Y_t^{ES_{pw}} &= \left[\frac{1}{\Omega^\theta} \frac{1}{f \frac{\bar{W}}{\bar{p}}} \left(A_t - \frac{\bar{W}}{\bar{p}} \right) \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\theta-\sigma}} \end{aligned} \quad (52)$$

This already illustrates (and we show in the loglinearized model below) that the elasticities of N and C are larger than in the flexible equilibrium when $\sigma > 1$. To keep marginal utility of nominal income constant in response to shocks, more variation along the extensive margin when curvature is lower.

Solving for the flexible equilibrium in the non-log case delivers:

$$\begin{aligned} N_t^{EF} &= \left(\frac{(\frac{\theta-1}{\theta})^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{\chi (\theta f)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}+\varphi}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+\varphi-(1-\frac{1}{\sigma})\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}} A_t^{\frac{1+\varphi}{1+\varphi-(1-\frac{1}{\sigma})\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}} \\ Y_t^{EF} &= (\theta-1) f \left(\frac{(\frac{\theta-1}{\theta})^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{\chi (\theta f)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}+\varphi}} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \frac{1}{1+\varphi-(1-\frac{1}{\sigma})\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}} A_t^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \frac{1+\varphi}{1+\varphi-(1-\frac{1}{\sigma})\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}} \end{aligned} \quad (53)$$

Consider inelastic labor $\varphi \rightarrow \infty$ without loss of generality, recovering the previous $N_t^{EF} = \frac{A_t}{\theta f}$ and $Y_t^{EF} = \frac{\theta-1}{\theta(\theta f)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}} A_t^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}$. We plot the expressions for output in the two cases, under a calibration that makes the economies identical in steady state ($A = 1$). Namely, we use as previously assume $f = \frac{1}{\theta} \left(\frac{\theta-1}{\theta} \right)^{\theta-1}$ and that the real wage is the same, $\frac{\bar{W}}{\bar{p}} = \frac{\theta-1}{\theta}$. Equating the expressions for Y^{EF} and $Y^{ES_{pw}}$ under these assumptions delivers the value of the steady-state marginal utility of nominal income that is required for this calibration, $\Omega = \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}$.

We therefore plot for illustrative purposes:

$$Y_t^{ES_{pw}} = (\theta A_t - \theta + 1)^{\frac{\sigma}{\theta-\sigma}}$$

under the same calibration as in the external effects case, but with $\sigma = 2$ now, along with the (same as before) Y_t^{EF} . As in Figure A.1




Fig. A2: Flexible Y^{EF} (red dash) vs sticky Y^{ES} (solid blue) prices & wages, $\sigma=2$

Optimal policy

Optimal policy can be easily found in this special case as choosing Ω_t to replicate the efficient F equilibrium; taking the inelastic-labor case for simplicity and without loss of generality this entails finding the Ω_t that solves:

$$Y_t^{ES_{pw}} = \left[\frac{1}{\Omega_t^\theta} \frac{1}{f \frac{\bar{W}}{\bar{p}}} \left(A_t - \frac{\bar{W}}{\bar{p}} \right) \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\theta-\sigma}} = Y_t^{EF} = \frac{\theta-1}{\theta (\theta f)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}} A_t^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}.$$

Then, as shown above this can be translated into an interest-rate policy using the Euler equation; under perfect foresight:

$$\begin{aligned} C_t^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} &= \beta \left(\frac{N_{t+1}}{N_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} \frac{1+I_t}{1+\pi_{t+1}} C_{t+1}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \\ \rightarrow \frac{1+I_t}{1+\pi_{t+1}} &= \beta^{-1} \frac{\Omega_t}{\Omega_{t+1}} \end{aligned}$$

Using the calibration with $\frac{\bar{W}}{\bar{p}} = \frac{\theta-1}{\theta}$ and $f = \frac{1}{\theta} \left(\frac{\theta-1}{\theta} \right)^{\theta-1}$ we obtain:

$$\Omega_t^* = \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} (\theta A_t - (\theta-1))^{\frac{1}{\theta}} A_t^{\frac{\sigma-\theta}{\sigma(\theta-1)}}.$$

This describes an increasing and concave (under our parameter restriction $\theta > \sigma > 1$) function, implying a monetary expansion (lower Ω) in response to adverse A_t shocks and contraction for TFP improvements.

Taking a second-order Taylor expansion around $\Omega = \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}$ delivers:

$$\tilde{\omega}_t^* \simeq \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} (1 - \sigma^{-1}) a_t - \frac{1}{2} \left[\theta - 1 + \left(\frac{\theta}{\sigma} - 1 \right) \frac{(1 - \sigma^{-1}) \theta}{(\theta - 1)^2} \right] a_t^2$$

which can be translated into interest-rate policy using the Euler equation. Notice that the first-order term is exactly the same (given inelastic labor) as the interest-rate policy derived in (28), implying a monetary easing in response to a negative shock when $\sigma > 1$. Furthermore, the second-order term is always negative under our parameter restriction $\theta > \sigma > 1$. Thus the second-order term will also imply an easing in response to negative shocks.

Optimal monetary policy in the simplest static model

To illustrate the basic difference between the economies with no entry, with entry but only sticky prices, and with entry and both sticky prices and wages, it is sufficient to work with the (nonlinear) static, stripped-down version of the model featuring a quantity equation. In the simplest sticky-prices-only model discussed at page 14, to alleviate the negative output gap, monetary policy needs to be contractionary—to generate entry. This is a counterintuitive implication shared with the standard no-entry NK model (The underlying reason, however, is fundamentally different—in the no-entry model, supply disruptions generate *positive* output gaps; with entry and sticky prices only, the output gap is negative but a monetary contraction triggers entry). In particular, the optimal money supply response to the productivity shock is directly calculated from Table 1 as the value that equates the sticky-price with the (optimal) flexible-price equilibrium, respectively for no-entry and free-entry

$$\left(\frac{M_t}{\bar{P}} \right)^{N*} = A_t \bar{L} \text{ and } \left(\frac{M_t}{\bar{p}} \right)^{E*} = \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} A_t \bar{L}. \quad (54)$$

This implication is overturned in our full model featuring sticky wages in addition to sticky prices, where a monetary *expansion* is instead required in response to an adverse supply shock.⁴⁹

Consider the simplest extension of the stripped-down model under logarithmic utility in consumption, whereby nominal wages are fixed to an arbitrary level: $W_t = \bar{W}$ replaces the labor supply equation (note that we maintain fixed prices too). The model solution can then be readily derived as:

$$\begin{aligned} N_t^{ES_{pw}} &= \frac{M_t}{f\bar{W}} \left(A_t - \frac{\bar{W}}{\bar{p}} \right); \\ Y_t^{ES_{pw}} &= \frac{M_t}{\bar{p}} N_t^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}. \end{aligned} \quad (55)$$

The expressions illustrate once more clearly that monetary expansions become entry-inducing as expected—and contrary to the predictions from the sticky-price only model, which is ill-suited to the analysis of monetary policy. (In this extreme version, the markup is in fact unaffected by demand shocks.)

This simple version allows us to illustrate that the optimal response of monetary policy (replicating the efficient, flexible-price-and-wage equilibrium) is then to increase—not decrease—money supply in response to a supply disruption. This optimal monetary policy is characterized by:

$$M_t^* = \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \frac{A_t}{(\theta A_t - (\theta - 1))^{\frac{1}{\theta}}} \rightarrow m_t^* \simeq \frac{1}{2} \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} a_t^2, \quad (56)$$

where the second-order approximation illustrates that the optimal policy now calls for a monetary expansion in response to negative shocks too—unlike both our baseline model and the standard no-entry NK model.

⁴⁹Note nevertheless that a benevolent policymaker can replicate the flexible-price equilibrium by employing entry subsidies: entrants pay only a fraction $s_t f$ of the fixed cost f . The optimal subsidy is easily found as

$$s_t^* = \theta A_t^{1-\theta} - (\theta - 1) A_t^{-\theta} \simeq 1 - \frac{1}{2} \theta (\theta - 1) a_t^2,$$

which requires a subsidy for both negative (to prevent exit) & positive (to support entry) supply shocks.

D.2 Loglinearized model

Here we provide the full set of loglinearized equations. All the various cases solved analytically in the paper are special cases of this general model. Note $\psi = \frac{\theta-1}{\kappa}$

Table A4. *Loglinearized Equations, NK Model*

1. Euler equation	$y_t = E_t y_{t+1} - \sigma (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}^C)$
2. Labor supply	$\phi l_t = w_t - \sigma^{-1} y_t$
3. CPI inflation definition	$\pi_t = \pi_t^C + (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}) (n_t - n_{t-1})$
4. Aggregate accounting	$y_t = w_t + l_t$
5. Phillips curve	$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} - \psi \mu_t$
6. Monetary Policy	$i_t = \phi \pi_t - \varepsilon_t$
7. Markup rule	$w_t - a_t = (\lambda + \frac{1}{\theta-1}) n_t - \mu_t$
8. Labor demand – free entry	$n_t = a_t + l_t + (\theta - 1) \mu_t$

Under nominal wage stickiness, we need to append the wage inflation definition

$$w_t = w_{t-1} + \pi_{w,t} - \pi_t^C$$

and replace the labor supply equation by the wage Phillips curve:

$$\pi_{w,t} = \beta E_t \pi_{w,t+1} + \psi_w (\sigma^{-1} y_t + \phi l_t - w_t),$$

where $\psi_w \equiv \theta_w / \kappa_w$. This nests the former in the case of flexible wages $\kappa_w = 0$.

The special case solved analytically in text amounts to assuming fixed nominal wages $\psi_w = 0$ in addition to fixed prices $\psi = 0$ (or, alternatively, fixed "real"—with respect to individual-price inflation—interest rate)

D.3 Sticky-wage only model

Consider the model with sticky wages but flexible prices, i.e. same as our benchmark but with $\kappa = 0$. We plot the impulse responses of this case for the endogenous-entry model in Figure A3.




Fig. A3: Effects of a 2% productivity fall: Flexible (red dash) vs Sticky (solid blue) wages. Flex prices.

As discussed in text, the recession is now only one-period lived and turns into an expansion from next period onwards, as firms cut prices to restore profitability and households increase hours worked.

This can be described analytically by using the loglinearized model in the case of fixed wages $\psi_w = 0$ and flexible prices $\kappa = 0$, implying $\mu_t = 0$ and $\pi_t^w = 0$ respectively. Imposing these in Table A4 and replacing the wage in the wage inflation definition we obtain:

$$\pi_t^C + \frac{1}{\theta - 1} (n_t - n_{t-1}) = a_{t-1} - a_t,$$

which determines equilibrium inflation in individual producer prices:

$$\pi_t = a_{t-1} - a_t$$

Replacing all in the Euler equation (note that aggregate accounting implies $y_t = \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} n_t$), we have:

$$n_t - E_t n_{t+1} = \sigma \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta - \sigma} (a_t - E_t a_{t+1}) - \sigma \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta - \sigma} \phi (a_{t-1} - a_t) + \sigma \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta - \sigma} \varepsilon_t,$$

which delivers the closed-form solution

$$n_t^{ES_w} = \sigma \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta - \sigma} a_t - \sigma \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta - \sigma} \phi a_{t-1} + \sigma \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta - \sigma} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \varepsilon_{t+i}.$$

This illustrates clearly the reversal dynamics visible in Figure A3, whereby current TFP shocks are negatively correlated to future entry (and aggregate activity).

D.4 Demand shocks in the no-entry model: with and without sticky wages

In Figure A4, we report the impulse responses from the no-entry NK model with and without sticky wages (sticky prices in both cases), illustrating that the markup and profits are counter-cyclical in the latter case, but the markup gets dampened and profits become procyclical under wage stickiness.




Fig. A4: No Entry. Effects of 1% interest rate cut: Sticky P only (green dots) vs Sticky P & W (solid blue)